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INTRODUCTION

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction .... 1

Over the past few years, legal scholars have fiercely debated the
meaning of this and other statements about the proper status of customary international law in the American legal system. While a majority of
scholars support treating customary international law ("CIL") as federal

common law, 2 an emerging group of revisionist scholars has sharply
challenged this view. These scholars argue that CIL has the status of
non-federal law under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 3 and that CIL is not

the proper area for federal court lawmaking.4

1. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
2. Federal common law refers to the federal law interpreted and applied by federal courts that
is not specifically authorized by a congressional enactment. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. d. (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)] (stating consensus among scholars that customary international law is federal common
law); Harold H. Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998)
(arguing that customary international law is federal law); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley & Goldsmith,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997) (same); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land. Customary International Law as Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997) (same); Ryan
Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal
Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997) (same).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that
customary international law as federal common law is a "modern" view with no doctrinal or historical justification) [hereinafter Bradley and Goldsmith, Critique]. See also JOHN M. ROGERS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW 115 (1999) (arguing that customary interna-
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The outcome of this debate will have significant practical consequences. If CIL is federal common law, federal courts could use CIL to
preempt inconsistent state law without any official authorization from

the President or Congress. 5 For instance, an individual facing the death
penalty for committing a crime prior to his eighteenth birthday could
challenge his death sentence on the grounds that the state statute
authorizing his execution violated federal law as expressed in CIL.6

Additionally, a number of federal courts have relied on the understanding that CIL is federal common law in order to adjudicate lawsuits
charging violations of international human rights law. 7 If the revisionist
view is accepted by the courts, some of the legal basis for this sort of
litigation would collapse. 8
But if CIL is not federal common law, what is it? On this point, revi-

sionist commentators differ. Most prominently, Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have argued that, in most cases, CIL is not a
rule of decision for any courts without statutory authorization but that it
can be part of the common law of the states to the extent that individual
states choose to incorporate it. 9

This position is sufficiently disquieting that even their fellow revisionist commentators disagree with this result.' 0 Indeed, the idea that
CIL could become part of state common law, and that state court interpretations of CIL would bind federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdictional law cannot always be federal common law); Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal
Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Weisburd, State
Courts] (arguing that federal court cases incorporating customary international law as federal
common law are wrongly decided).
5. One prominent scholar has suggested that courts should be using international law in this
way. See Lea Brilmayer, Federalism,State Authority, and the Preemptive Power ofInternational
Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295 (arguing for application of customary international law to preempt
state law).
6. See id. at 323-326 (discussing the possible effect of CIL on the juvenile death penalty)
7. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (suit charging human rights violations in Bosnia); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (suit
charging multinational corporation with human rights violations). The modem wave of international human rights litigation was launched by a decision in the Second Circuit which essentially
held that customary international law is federal law. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980).
8. If the courts adopt the revisionist position, Filartigaand its progeny are almost certain to
be overruled. Cf.Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith,
Illegitimacy].
9. Bradley & Goldsmith, Illegitimacy, supra note 8, at 349-5 1.
10. ROGERS, supra note 4, at 115 (arguing that (i) CIL can become federal law if and only if
Congress remains silent, (ii) the CIL rule remains within the constitutional powers of Congress,
and (iii) the President has acquiesced in this interpretation); cf Weisburd, supra note 4, at 51
("[T]he best way to read Erie is not as woodenly equating general law with state law ... ").
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tion, has been dismissed by highly respected scholars as "bizarre,""
"radical,"'12 and "absurd." 3 As one such scholar has confidently written,
"even casual reflection compels the conclusion that Bradley and Goldsmith are utterly mistaken."'
At the heart of these objections to the revisionist view are two claims
about the historical role of state courts in relation to CIL. First, adherents of a "nationalist" view 15 of CIL argue that the Framers of the Constitution intended to allocate control over almost all questions of international law to the federal courts.' 6 Second, nationalist scholars have
argued that the doctrinal treatment of CIL by federal and state courts
supports a dominant, if not exclusive,
role for federal courts in the in7
terpretation of CIL questions.'
Since national scholars believe that state courts have not played a
significant role in the development of CIL, they have asserted that
leaving questions of CIL to parochial state courts invites chaos; state
courts would develop conflicting rules of CIL and impermissibly interfere in matters of foreign relations. Because this critique of the revisionist position depends in great part on the validity of their understanding of the historical role of state courts, it is surprising that there is
almost no commentary examining the historical foundations of these assumptions.19
This article seeks to fill this gap by describing the historical role of
state courts in the interpretation and development of CIL in the Ameri11.
12.
13.
14.

Koh, supra note 2, at 1850.
Stephens, supra note 2, at 397.
Neuman, supra note 2, at 382.
Koh, supra note 2, at 1827.

15. I refer to scholars favoring the federal status of CIL as adherents of the "nationalist" position. Bradley and Goldsmith coined the term "modern position" to characterize the same view.
Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique,supra note 4, at 816. Because the term "modern position" assumes that the nationalist view is really the product of modern, rather than historical understandings, I use the more neutral term "nationalist."

16. Cf Koh, supra note 2, at 1846 (noting that transfer of judicial authority over customary
international law from states to federal government occurred "at the beginning of the Repub-

lic..."); Stephens, supra note 2, at 411-13 (explaining that "[t]he framers' concern about enforcement of the law of nations thus led them to draft a Constitution that guaranteed federal control
over the nation's international law obligations.").
17. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 2, at 373-78; Stephens, supra note 2, at 413-32.
18. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 2, at 1850 (arguing that if customary international law were determined by state courts, the President would have difficulty advising visiting head of states to

different immunity rules depending on which states they visit).
19. Only A.M. Weisburd has provided a meaningful discussion of the pre-Erie role of state
courts and CIL, but his analysis remains largely focused on the attitude of federal courts to state
court decisions rather than on the state courts themselves. See Weisburd, supra note 4, at 38-41.
While he does discuss some modern state court applications of CIL, he does not discuss the historical role of state courts. See id. at 13-14.
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can legal system. It aims to test the validity of nationalist claims about
the role of state courts against the historical and doctrinal record of state
courts applying CIL. While I do not purport to offer a definitive historical account, my discussion of the role of state courts in the application
of CIL reveals that, at the very least, the revisionist understanding of
how CIL has been incorporated into American law has far greater plausibility than nationalist critics have admitted.
I begin by revisiting the complex question of how the Founding Generation viewed the proper role of state courts in the interpretation of
CIL. While the Founders clearly sought to limit state court jurisdiction
over some kinds of cases involving CIL, it is highly doubtful that the
Founders intended to make federal court exclusivity over CIL a constitutional requirement. Instead, it is likely that the Founders intended for
Congress to use its politicaljudgment in deciding how to allocate jurisdiction over CIL between the federal and state court systems. In exercising this judgment, it is revealing that, in some cases, Congress made
an effort to preserve an independent role for state courts in the application of CIL.
Next, this article surveys the development of four CIL doctrines in
state courts: (1) diplomatic immunity in transit; (2) the irregular abduction of overseas fugitives; (3) sovereign immunity; and (4) restrictions
on trading with enemy aliens. As a result of Congress's jurisdictional
allocations, the development of these CIL doctrines fell predominantly
within the realm of state court decisions. My analysis of these doctrines
reveals that, in many cases, state courts acted as the primary judicial
fora for originating, developing, and applying rules of CIL. Indeed, in
several cases, federal courts explicitly disclaimed any authority to review state court interpretations of these CIL doctrines. My survey confirms that, at least in the case of these CIL doctrines, both federal and
state courts have historically treated CIL as general, and not federal,
common law.
While discussing the development of these doctrines, this article also
highlights the way in which these CIL doctrines eventually became federal law. While it is true that all of these CIL doctrines (with one exception) are understood to be federal questions today, the federalization of
these CIL doctrines never occurred through unilateral federal court
lawmaking. Rather, the political branches of the federal government Congress and the President - codified these CIL rules through statute,
treaty, or executive branch lawmaking.
This regime of CIL interpretation, which permits state courts to develop rules of CIL independently, subject only to revisions by the political branches of the federal government, resonates with my account of
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the Founders' intended judicial framework. Though one might expect
this messy regime to result in inconsistent interpretations of CIL rules,
my discussion shows that state courts rarely disagreed with each other
or with federal courts, even though they were not subject to Supreme
Court review. To the extent such splits occurred, state courts were just
as likely to develop rules of CIL less injurious to foreign interests than
the prevailing federal court interpretation.
The ability of state courts to develop uniform interpretations of CIL
independently helps explain why federal courts after Erie infrequently
faced the question of whether federal courts are bound by state court
determinations of CIL. Instead, the branches of the federal government
most attuned to foreign relations and CIL development - the Congress
and the President - would codify nationwide rules of CIL when they
deemed it necessary as a matter of domestic or foreign policy. Indeed,
the political branches would sometimes rely on state court interpretations of CIL as evidence of a developing CIL rule. Until such codification, a rule of CIL remained open to development by either a state or
federal court.
Finally, I conclude that this historical account of state courts and CIL
has at least two important implications for the ongoing debate over the
status of CIL in the American legal system. First, it weakens the historical foundations for the nationalist view by demonstrating that, as a
matter of original understanding, CIL was not an exclusively federal
question. This reading of the Founders' understanding is confirmed by
the important role that state courts played in the origination and development of CIL.
Second, my discussion indicates that state courts have shown an ability to interpret, to apply, and sometimes to "create" rules of CIL independent of federal court supervision without causing irreparable damage
to U.S. foreign relations. At the very least, the ability of state courts to
generate sophisticated and uniform doctrines of CIL weighs heavily
against any policy arguments for the practical necessity of federal court
control over CIL.
This article proceeds in three parts. First, I review the Founders'
views on the proper division between federal and state courts in the interpretation of CIL. Then, I go on to survey the development of four
CIL doctrines in state courts and their eventual federalization by Congress and the President. Finally, I examine the implications of my historical account for the ongoing debate over the proper status of CIL in
the American judicial system.
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II.

THE FOUNDERS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Many members of the Founding generation distrusted the ability of
state courts to apply the law of nations, the term used for CIL at that
time. 2° Their distrust of state courts in these matters is reflected, to some
degree, in Article III of the Constitution, which allocates jurisdiction
over several kinds of law of nations cases to the federal courts. 2' Scholars have seized on the Founders' antipathy toward state courts in order
to claim that the Founders intended "a Constitution that guaranteedfederal control over the nation's international law obligations." 22 While the
Founding generation sought to limit state court involvement to the interpretation and application of the law of nations, the historical evidence
also indicates that the Founders believed that the state courts should
have an independent role in applying the law of nations.
The Founders' intellectual framework assumed that both federal and
state courts would interpret and apply the law of nations as part of the
general common law. Their solution to the problematic state court application of the law of nations, however, was to give federal courts jurisdiction over some, but not all, kinds of law of nations cases. Most
importantly, the question of which courts should control interpretation
of the law of nations was understood to be a political judgment made by
Congress when it created the lower federal courts in the Judiciary Act of
1789.
To support this conclusion, I rely on a variety of historical sources.
These sources include statements by influential delegates at the Constitutional Convention and during the ratification period, the actions of the
20. The "law of nations" is the term used in the 18th century for what is now called international law, RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, pt. I, ch. 2 introductory note, at 41 ("the law of
nations, later referred to as international law"); see MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1988) (explaining that there are two types of international law, customary law and treaty law and that the term law of nations usually referred to customary law).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §.2.
22. Stephens, supra note 2, at 412 (emphasis added). The view that the Founders, in their allocation ofjurisdiction, effectively sought to federalize judicial control of the law of nations, is both
widespread and longstanding. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the Na-

tional Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 38 (1953) ("The Convention was in substantial agreement that there must be a national judiciary and that it must have, at least in the last
resort, a paramount authority with respect to the Law of Nations and treaties."); Koh, supra note
2, at 1841 (discussing Framers support for federal control over CIL); Jules Lobel, The Limits of
ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV

1071, 1093, 1093 n. 110 (1985) (concluding that framers intended that "international law was to
be federal law, enforced by the national judiciary"); Douglas Sylvester, InternationalLaw as
Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law ofNations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.

& POL. 1,7,21-32 (1999) (concluding that leading members of early Republic intended to create
federal jurisdiction over all matters touching on national concerns and that all cases touching on
the law of nations were of national concern).
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First Congress in creating the lower federal court system, the legal
opinions issued by the Attorney Generals in the first three presidential
administrations, and opinions issued by federal and state courts relating
to the law of nations during the 1790s. While I do not claim that a historical account based on these sources conclusively determines the
"original understanding," 23 this historical account does at least offer a
plausible description of the Founders' understanding of how CIL would
be applied by courts.
A.

The Problem with State Courts

There is little doubt that the application of the law of nations and
treaties in state courts during the Articles of Confederation era caused
foreign policy problems for the fledging United States. Even before the
successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress passed a resolution directing the individual states to comply with
the law of nations when determining the legality of captures on the high
seas. 24 The Continental Congress was concerned about potential foreign
policy problems that might arise if state courts enforced laws against
foreign diplomats or awarded prizes to privateers in violation of the law
of nations. In 1781, it passed another resolution recommending that
states provide punishments for violations of the law of nations. 25 These
resolutions did not have much of an effect.
Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia and a leading member of
Virginia's delegation to the Constitutional Convention, complained that
the Continental Congress could not cause infractions of the law of nations to be punished and warned that state court decisions failing to
honor treaty obligations and protect foreign diplomats could give foreign countries cause for war.?6 But the Founders were not concerned
only about violations of the law of nations. Madison, for instance, also
23. This article does not take a position on the authoritative force of the original understanding
for constitutional interpretation.
24. See William Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective JurisdictionOver Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law ofNations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 490 (1986) (citing 21 J. CONT. CONG.

1136-37 (1781)).
25. See id. at 491-93, 492 n. 143 (describing notorious Marbois affair involving attack on
French Ambassador in Philadelphia). See also William Dodge, The Historical Origins of the
Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the Originalists, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221,

226-27 (1996) (describing state court violations of the law of nations).
26. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 819, 825 n. 25 (1989) [hereinafter Law of Nations] (citing 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 19, 24-25 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND]). See also John
Jay, 34 J. CONT. CONG. 1774-1789 111 ("[T]he foederal [sic] Government does not appear ...to

be vested with any judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judgment of [cases involving foreign diplomats]."
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worried that state courts would mistreat foreign citizens in the application of local law, thereby discouraging foreign trade.27
B.

The Text of the Constitution

It bears emphasizing that the delegates probably did not arrive at the
Constitutional Convention fixated on a single solution to the problem of
state courts and the law of nations, although a national judiciary was the
obvious place to start. 28 At the beginning of the Convention, Randolph
proposed the creation of a national judiciary to hold jurisdiction over
"all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases
in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested ... and questions which may involve the national Peace and Harmony., 29 Along different lines, Charles Pinckney
offered a plan which created no inferior federal courts but gave appellate jurisdiction over state courts to a federal supreme court on questions
involving the "Construction of Treaties made by the U.S. - or on the
Law of Nations .... 30
Eventually, the question of federal court jurisdiction was addressed in
Article III. An early draft of Article III provided for federal court jurisdiction over cases "which may arise ... on the Law of Nations."3 For
reasons that are not explained in the Convention debates, the phrase
"the Law of Nations" was deleted from the final version of Article 111.32
Instead, the judicial power of the federal courts was divided into broad
grants of jurisdiction and particularized grants.

27. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA

IN 1787 583 (J. Elliott, ed. 1881) ("We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get justice done
them in these [state] courts, and this has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or re-

siding among us.").
28. Several commentators have cited a letter by George Mason describing "the most prevalent
idea" at the Convention as the establishment of "a judiciary system with cognizance of all such
matters as depend upon the law of nations." Letter to Arthur Lee (May 21, 1787) (cited in Jay,
Law of Nations, supra note 26, at 830); see also Stephens, supra note 2, at 407 n.66. Mason's

statement, however, should be given little weight, given that Mason cautions in the same letter
that, "I arrived in this city on Thursday evening, but found so few of the deputies here from the
several States that I am unable to form any certain opinion on the subject of our mission." 3
FARRAND, supra note 26, at 24.
29. 1 FARRAND, supra note 26, at 21-22. Randolph made these proposals in the "Virginia
Plan." Dickinson, supra note 22, at 36-37 n.31.
30. Dickinson, supra note 22, at 37 (citing 2 FARRAND, supra note 26, at 136).

31. Jay, Law of Nations, supra note 27, at 819, 830 n. 57 (citing 2 FARRAND, supra note 26, at
157).
32. 2 FARRAND, supra note 26, at 157 (discussing deletion of the term "law of nations" from a
draft of Article III).
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The broadest grant included "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority," with Article III
extending jurisdiction "to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;" and to cases "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 33
One commentator has suggested that this deletion shows that the
Founders rejected giving federal courts jurisdiction over all cases involving the law of nations.34 This reading, however, has been seriously
questioned. 35 It is possible that the phrase "the law of nations" was deleted for reasons unrelated to issues of federal court control over CIL. In
the eighteenth century, the phrase "the law of nations" was sometimes
used to encompass areas of law we now consider different, including
the law merchant, maritime law, and the law of conflicts. 36 The Founders may not have wanted to federalize jurisdiction over all of these areas of law, especially the "law merchant" because it could create federal
jurisdiction over contracts between citizens of the same state. 37 Indeed,
the Founders noticed that differing understandings of this phrase created
another problem with the "law of nations" that continues to confuse
nations, they observed, is often too
scholars of CIL today. The law of
"vague and deficient to be a rule." 38
It is also likely that the simple incorporation of the law of nations into
Article III did not satisfy those members of the Founding generation
who feared state court encroachment into foreign affairs. As Alexander
Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, Article III's particularized
categories of federal jurisdiction - diplomats, admiralty, treaties, and
aliens - were intended to extend federal jurisdiction over cases implicating foreign relations but which did not necessarily involve the law of
nations. 39 After considering the idea that "cases arising upon treaties
and the laws of nations ...may be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the [s]tates, '' 40 he goes on to argue that
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
34. See Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw, 41 VAND. L. REV.
1205, 1222-23 (1988) [hereinafter Weisburd, Executive Branch].
35. See Jay, Law of Nations, supra note 26, at 830-32.
36. See id.at 832.
37. Id.
38. 2 FARRAND, supra note 26, at 615 (quoting Governor Morris in the context of debates over
"define and punish" clause).
39. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
40. Id. at 476. This particular quotation has been mistakenly used to signify that Hamilton
equated jurisdiction over treaties with jurisdiction over the law of nations. See, e.g., Koh, supra
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Article III's approach is superior because it was "by far most safe and
most expedient to
refer all those [cases involving foreigners] to the na41
tional tribunals."
Hamilton's explanation assumes that the law of nations was not incorporated into the "law of the United States" for the purposes of Article III. But nationalist commentators, and courts following their view,
have cited strong statements from John Jay implying that such incorporation had indeed occurred.
Under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded
in one sense and executed in the same manner-whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in thirteen
States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent ...The wisdom of the convention in
committing such questions to the jurisdiction andjudgment of
courts appointed by and responsible only to one nationalgovernment cannot be too much commended.4 2
Jay's statement, an exposition of the Constitution made during the
ratification process, does not make much sense if the Constitution's
drafters had explicitly rejected the incorporation of the law of nations
into federal court jurisdiction. One way of reconciling his statement
with Hamilton's understanding is to read Jay's reference to uniform interpretations of the law of nations cases as a shorthand reference to
cases arising under the particularized grants of Article III.
On the other hand, Hamilton and Jay may have simply disagreed. As
Chief Justice, Jay also classified the law of nations with treaties, the
constitution, and federal statutes as the three components of the "law of
the United States" in the context of instructing a grand jury in an indictment charging violations of the law of nations.43 This statement
certainly implies that the law of nations falls within the federal judicial
note 2, at 1841 (stating that" 'modem position' extends at least as far back as Alexander Hamilton.").
As other commentators have recognized, this is almost certainly a misreading of Hamilton's
statement. Hamilton actually used this section to compare the idea of federalizing "the law of nations" with his preferred result: federalizing cases involving aliens, diplomats, and admiralty. See,
e.g., Weisburd, State Courts, supra note 4, at 35-38. See also Jay, Law of Nations, supra note 26,

at 831. Hamilton's point here is that federalizing all cases involving the law of nations would not
be enough to prevent foreign policy problems.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 39, at 477.
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
This passage was cited in Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887, to support the Court's assertion that customary international law is a matter of federal law whether or not Congress acts to define it by statute.
43. Henfield's Case, I1F. Cas. 1099, 1100-01 (No. 6,360) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
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the Laws of

Jay may have believed that the law of nations was part of the law of
the United States within the meaning of Article III, but Hamilton's disquisition on Article III shows that he did not see things in quite the
same way. Neither did James Wilson, a prominent delegate representing
Pennsylvania at the convention, an associate justice on the first Supreme
Court, and one of the judges giving the jury charge in the same set of
prosecutions initiated by Jay's grand jury charge. 5 Wilson traced the
law of nations' entry into American jurisprudence throuih the common
law rather than as part of the "laws of the United States." According to
Wilson, the common law liberally borrows from other laws and systems
when the case requires it. 47 If a question arises under the common law
which requires resolution by the law of nations, "By that law she 4will
8
decide the question. For that law in its full extent is adopted by her.,
Wilson's account fits better into the prevailing intellectual framework
than the nationalist reading of Jay's views because the Founders still
believed in a general common law that could be discovered by judges
independent of statutory guidance. Indeed, as Justice Story would famously decide, the general common law was not "the law of the several
states" within the meaning of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 49
Rather, it was a law independently discoverable and applicable by all
American courts, state or federal, with neither system able to overrule
the other's interpretation of it. 50 This framework helps make sense of
Hamilton's claim, printed below, that the incorporation of the law of
nations by the common law of the states means that the law of nations
has been adopted by the United States as well.
The common law of England which was [and] is in force in
each of these states adopts the law of Nations, the positive
equally with the natural, as a part of itself... Ever since we

have been an Independent nation we have appealed to and
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
45. For a useful discussion of the background of Henfield's Case and the other effects of the
Neutrality Proclamation, see David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress,
1793-95, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 4-15 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1107.
49. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1838).
50. For an influential discussion of the crucial importance of the general common law to understanding the Founders' attitude toward common law, see William Fletcher, The General
Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1513, 1517 (1984).
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acted upon the modem law of Nations as understood in
Europe ... The President's Proclamation of Neutrality refers
expressly to the modern law of Nations . .. 'Tis indubitable
that the customary law of European Nations is as a part othe
common law and by adoption that of the U[nited] States.!

As a part of the common law, 52 any federal or state court that had another basis for asserting jurisdiction could also apply the law of nations.
But neither the law of nations, nor the common law of which it was a
part, could confer jurisdiction on a court by itself. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the Founders could believe that the law of nations would
be part of the "law of the land" yet still did not explicitly confer federal

jurisdiction over all cases involving the law of nations. The deletion of
the phrase "the law of nations" from Article III only confirms this understanding.

51. Alexander Hamilton, To Defence No. XX (Oct. 23-24, 1795), in 19 PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, at 341-42 (Harold Syrett ed., 1973) (emphasis added). An early opinion
from the Attorney General concurred with this analysis. See Territorial Rights-Florida, 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (Jan. 26, 1797), 1797 WL 419 ("The common law has adopted the law of nations in its fullest extent, and made it a part of the law of the land.") (emphasis added).
52. Most commentators, even those advocating the nationalist view, concede that the law of
nations was considered part of the general common law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
2, pt. I, ch. 2 introductory note at 41; see also Neuman, supra note 2, at 373; Stephens, supra note
2, at 400 & n. 34. The Supreme Court also has made this understanding very explicit. See
Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892) (stating that question of international law "is one
of those questions of general jurisprudence .... ").
A few dissenters, however, continue to misunderstand the significance of the general common
law. See Koh, supra note 2, at 1825 n.8 (citing The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815)
(emphasis added) ("It seems unlikely that the Chief Justice would have understood the Supreme
Court to be 'bound by the law of nations' had that law merely represented the law of the several
states.")). But Marshall could feel "bound" by the general common law even though he had no
basis as Chief Justice to review state court interpretations of it.
Other scholars plainly reject the general common law view. See Jordan J. Paust,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 30 n.34 (1996) [hereinafter Paust,
INTERNATIONAL LAW] (arguing that viewing CIL as "mere" common law is simplistic and citing
cases implying that the law of nations and the common law are different.). Professor Paust does
not offer any analysis of these cited cases, however, and he does not explain how those cases
viewed the place of CIL in the legal system if not as part of the common law. Without such an
alternative explanation, it is hard to understand why scholars should abandon the "law of nations
incorporated by common law" view that many Founders explicitly endorsed.
For example, Professor Paust himself cites Attorney General Lee, see Territorial RightsFlorida, supra note 51, at 69, for the proposition that the law of nations is part of United States
law, but he omits the section in the same opinion where Lee explicitly identifies the "common
law" as the vehicle for incorporating the law of nations. See Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301,
301 n.4 (1999) [hereinafter Paust, Customary InternationalLaw]. This would not be worth noting, except that Professor Paust has himself accused other scholars of making references to
phrases like the "law of the land" that are "incomplete and potentially misleading." Id. at 309 &
309 n.44 (attacking Professors Bradley & Goldsmith for incomplete citations).
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Instead, as Hamilton explained, Article III focuses on grants of federal jurisdiction for particular cases involving not just law of nations issues, but also for cases that might create foreign policy problems for the
new nation. 53 Thus, it is important to remember that the Founders saw
the problem with state courts as extending beyond their violations of the
law of nations. Rather, the state courts were also creating foreign policy
problems by unfairly applying local laws against foreigners, thus discouraging trade as well as outraging foreign nations. 54 For this reason,
the Founders' efforts to resolve the problem of state courts did not necessarily mean that they intended to federalize jurisdiction over any
question involving the law of nations. It is more likely that they simply
intended to federalize jurisdiction over those cases that might affect foreign relations, whether such a case involved the law of nations or not.
At the very least, the statements by influential delegates to the Constitutional Convention demonstrate that they were not of one mind when
it came to allocating jurisdiction to federal courts over cases involving
the law of nations. While Jay implied that the law of nations was incorporated into federal court jurisdiction by Article III's reference to the
"law of the United States," Hamilton and Wilson thought differently.
Indeed, their view that the law of nations was part of the common law
would be reflected by subsequent legal opinions by the executive
branch and decisions by federal courts.
C.

Congress and the JudiciaryAct of 1789

Article III provides little textual guidance for federal jurisdiction beyond the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. As many commentators
have observed, Article III outlined the limits of federal judicial power,
but gave the task of actually allocating most of that jurisdiction to the
Congress. The manner in which the first Congress fulfilled this task
strongly implied that members of the first Congress did not believe that
federal court exclusivity over CIL cases was constitutionally mandated.55
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 39.

54. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 26.

55. It seems clear that the first Congress did not believe, for instance, that the general common
law, including the law of nations, was part of the "law of United States" within the meaning of
Article III's grant of federal court jurisdiction or Article VI's power to preempt inconsistent state
law. In Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress granted the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over state court decisions that involve: (1)the validity of a "treaty, statute of, or an
authority exercised under the United States; (2) the validity of a "a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State" that arguably conflicts with the "constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States;" (3) the construction of "any clause of the [C]onstitution or of a treaty, or statute
of, or commission held under the United States." In Section 34, Congress directs federal courts to
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While some commentators persuasively argue that the Convention
delegates intended to require Congress to give the federal courts the
whole scope of jurisdiction permitted by Article I1,56 the first Congress
plainly did not agree.57 Article III's broad language 8 could certainly be
read to provide Congress with substantial discretion in the allocation of
jurisdiction. Congress did not hesitate to exercise this discretion when
allocating jurisdiction over cases involving the law of nations.
In exercising its politicaljudgment as to which cases required exclusive federal court jurisdiction and which cases could remain concurrent
or exclusively with the states, the first Congress effectively controlled
which courts would hear cases involving law of nations. Given the
Founders' obvious skepticism about the ability of state courts to handle
cases involving the law of nations, it is hardly surprising that Congress
provided federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over several aspects
of the law of nations. What is surprising is that despite the well-known
problems of state courts applying CIL and the participation of many
Convention delegates in the drafting of the Judiciary Act, 59 the first
Congress still preserved a role for state courts in law of nations cases.
For instance, it is true that Congress gave the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits against ambassadors, public ministers,
and their domestic servants, but Congress only gave the Court original
jurisdiction for suits brought by ambassadors, public ministers, or where
a consul or vice consul shall be a party. 6° This meant that foreign diplomats could choose between state or federal courts when the foreign
diplomat itself chose to bring a suit under the law of nations. Congress
made sure that a foreign diplomat could still file a case involving the
law of nations in state court.
apply the common law of the state "except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide." Thus, for the most part, the Judiciary Act's
drafters use the term "statute" when granting federal courts jurisdiction over questions of federal
law that is not found in treaties or the constitution. Because the Judiciary Act largely reflects
Congress's understanding of the requirements of Article III, the repeated use of the term "statute"

instead of "laws of the United States" is a strong indication that the first Congress believed the
"laws of the United States" in Article III and Article VI referred to federal statutes rather than to
federal statutes and federal common law.
56. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 192 (1999) (citing authorities for

mandating of jurisdiction under Article III and explaining that full judicial power theory has
never been followed at any point in American history and "seems clearly untenable").
57. See David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of

Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 209-10 (1995) (describing debate
over Judiciary Act).

58. U.S. CONST, art III, §. 1 ("inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain
and establish").

59. See Currie, supra note 57, at 209.
60. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81-1.
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As many commentators have noted, Congress also provided jurisdiction to district and circuit courts for "all causes where an alien sues for a
tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." Less attention has been paid, however, to the text of the original Alien Tort Statute, which provided for concurrent state court jurisdiction over such suits. 62 Again, the structure of the clause essentially
allows the plaintiff alien to choose whether to sue in federal or state
court, but it is nevertheless striking that the First Congress went out of
its way to preserve state court forums for lawsuits that would be completely based upon the law of nations. If, for any reason, an alien
brought a case in state court, that court would be responsible for interpreting and applying the law of nations in order to resolve the case. If
such a suit went forward, it was possible that the Supreme Court would
not be able to review the state court's final judgment because section 25
gives it appellate jurisdiction over state courts only on the ground that
the state court's final jud ment violates "the constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States." As a later court would hold, a question of
common law like the law of nations does not fall within the meaning of
the laws of the United States for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under
64
section 25 of the Judiciary Act.
Similar stories could be told about the First Congress's insistence on
preserving a common law remedy in civil cases in the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. Much of the law applied in admiralty cases was
also drawn from the law of nations. 65 The "saving to the suitors" clause
preserved a role for state courts in cases otherwise completely within
the admiralty jurisdiction. 66 Again, nothing in Article III requires such
an accommodation, but under the reading of Article III followed by the
first Congress, nothing prohibited such an accommodation either. Congress plainly sought to preserve a role for state courts in cases involving
the law of nations.
In sum, the First Congress exercised its political discretion in the
process of creating the federal court system. While Article III seems to
authorize exclusive federal jurisdiction in all cases involving diplomats,
aliens, and admiralty, Congress insisted on preserving a role for state

61. Id. at§9, 1 Stat. at77.
62. See Casto, supra note 24, at 490.
63. Judiciary Act, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-86.
64. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
65. See Weisburd, State Courts,supra note 4, at 30 & 30 nn. 184 & 189 (discussing admiralty
law's relationship to the law of nations).
66. See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 362-63 (1959) (discussing

historical significance of saving to the suitors clause).
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courts in these cases. Not only do these actions demonstrate Congress's
sensitivity to state court interests, but it also indicates the First Congress
did not believe the Constitution requires giving federal courts exclusive
control over all cases involving or arising under the law of nations.67
This conclusion is hardly controversial. Commentators have long
recognized that Congress is not required to grant inferior federal courts
the full judicial power contemplated by Article 111. 68 It would seem unnecessary even to make this argument were it not for the substantial
amount of commentary arguing that the Constitution requires exclusive
69
federal court control over cases involving the law of nations.
It bears repeating: nothing in Article III prevents Congress from giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the cases most likely to
implicate law of nations concerns, yet the actions of the First Congress
plainly indicate the First Congress's belief that such jurisdictional allocations are not constitutionally mandated and fall within Congress's political discretion. Moreover, it used this discretion to preserve a role for
state courts even in cases where the Constitution had explicitly allocated
jurisdiction to the federal courts.
D.

The President and the Law of Nations

The understanding that Congress would dominate the allocation of jurisdiction for cases involving the law of nations is further supported by
legal opinions issued by the President's chief legal advisor, the Attorney
General. These opinions, usually issued in response to protests by foreign diplomats, reveal the way the first Attorneys General understood
the place of the law of nations in the judicial system. First, the Attorneys General assumed that Congress could control how and whether the
law of nations should be applied. Second, in the absence of congressional authorization, the Attorney General would advise parties to seek
enforcement of the law of nations at common law. Depending on the
particular Attorney General's view of the proper scope of federal court
common law powers, such a suggestion might require the offended
party to seek remedies for violations of the law of nations in state court.
In response to a dispute over the immunity afforded to a Dutch diplomat's domestic servant, Attorney General Randolph admitted that
Congress could alter the application of the law of nations by a federal
67. See Currie, supra note 57, at 210 (observing that Judiciary Act "clearly reveals Congress's
conviction that nothing in the Constitution required it to give federal trial courts jurisdiction over
all the cases and controversies enumerated in Article III.").
68. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 56, at 192,
69. See, e.g., articles cited, supra note 22, arguing for nationalist view of the Founding.
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An officer of the New York state court had entered the Dutch
minister's residence to arrest the minister's servant, apparently in violation of the law of nation's guarantee of diplomatic immunity for diplomats and their domestic servants. The Dutch minister protested to the
U.S. federal government, requesting that the arresting officer be prosecuted for violating the law of nations.71
Randolph acknowledged that the law of nations was not adopted by
either the Constitution or by federal statute, but that it was nevertheless
"essentially a part of the law of the land., 72 He then notes that "a people
may regulate it so as to be binding upon the departments of their own
government" but that "with regard to foreigners, every change is at the
peril of the nation which makes it."'73 Although the arrest of the diplomat's servant appears to have violated the law of nations, 74 Congress
had by statute refused to extend diplomatic immunity to servants who
did not fulfill certain registration requirements or who had contracted
into debts prior to entering their diplomatic position. 75 Therefore, "Congress appear[s] to have excluded every resort to the law of nations" for
the servant's arrest; otherwise, the 76arresting officer could be prosecuted
for violations of the law of nations.
Randolph's analysis is interesting because it reveals an important assumption: a sovereign, in this case "the people," may adjust the law of
nations at their own discretion subject only to international sanctions.
Most importantly, the opinion presumed that Congress could control the
application of the law of nations even though Congress's interpretation
may conflict or even violate the law of nations.77
court. 70

70. See Who Privileged from Arrest, I Op. Att'y Gen. 26 (1792) (Randolph).
71. This case apparently originated prior to the ratification of the Constitution. SEE JULIUS
GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND

BEGINNINGS TO 1801 310-11 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971); see also Casto, supra note 24, at 494.
72. Who Privileged from Arrest, supra note 70, at 27. Again, there is every reason to believe
that the phrase "law of the land" here refers to the law of nations' inclusion in the general common law and not as part of the law of the United States.
73. Id.
74. In his work, Emerich de Vattel appears to require unequivocal immunity for an ambassador's servants, though it is possible that he allowed exceptions for servants who are not entirely
dependent on the ambassador. "The persons in an ambassador's retinue partake of his inviolability; his independency extends to every individual in his household... [they] immediately depend

on him alone, and are exempt from the jurisdiction of the country, into which they would not
have come without such reservation in their favour." EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 619-20 (Joseph Chitty ed. 1867).

75. Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9 §§ 25, 27, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18 (1790).
76. Who Privileged from Arrest, supra note 70, at 28.
77. Chief Justice Marshall's observation that the Court is "bound by the law of nations, which
is a part of the law of the land" does not contradict this reading of Randolph's opinion. The Ne-

reide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).

2001]

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

283

One of Randolph's successors as Attorney General, Charles Lee, also
revealed his deference to Congress's judgment over the cases involving
law of nations, while adding an interesting recommendation for an alternative remedy. 78 Although Lee addressed a slightly different issue in
an opinion that responded to a diplomatic protest over a raid into Spanish Florida by private American citizens seeking runaway slaves, the
opinion also demonstrated his assumption that Congress's judgment
was determinative.79 Lee readily conceded that the American slave
owners had violated the law of nations by violating Spain's territorial
integrity.80 Congress, however, had not passed a law under its authority
to punish "[o]ffences against the Law of Nations,"8 1 so the Americans
were "only liable to be prosecuted in our courts at common law for the
misdemeanor. ,8 2 He did not specify whether such criminal cases could
be prosecuted in federal courts, thus neatly sidestepping the contentious
issue of whether federal courts could prosecute common law crimes.
What is important for my purposes, however, is that without congressional authorization, Lee immediately turned to the common law powers of courts without specifying that such a prosecution could only be
brought in federal court. Lee assumed that violations of the law of nations could be prosecuted at common law in the absence of statutory
authorization. Moreover, it is worth noting what he did not say in his legal opinion. He did not say that such a suit under the law of nations

Marshall's analysis followed Randolph's assumption that the law of nations was subject to

domestic modification, which is again consistent with its status as general common law. A fuller
quotation refers to the request by one of the parties that the Court modify the law of nations rule
in the way Congress would have wanted, to which Marshall replied:
If it be the will of the government to apply [the rule] to Spain ... the government will
manifest that will by passing an act for the purpose. Till such an act be passed, the
Court is bound by the law of nations which is part of the law of the land.

13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 434.
78. In response to complaints by the minister of Spain charging libelous publications by a private American citizen, he opined that such a libel could and should be prosecuted by the United

States as part of its obligations under the law of nations. See Libelous Publications, 1 Op. Att'y
Gen. 71 (1797). Lee does not refer specifically to the law of nations for authority, but his discussion of the duties of the United States to prosecute insults against foreign ministers could only
have been drawn from the law of nations because he refers to section 25 of the Act of April 30,

1790, authorizing federal prosecutions for infractions against the law of nations. See id. at 74.
Interestingly, Lee then went on to analyze whether that prosecution could take place in the Supreme Court. Though "the constitution has given to the Supreme Court a capacity to hold crimi-

nal jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors," he concluded that "no law exists calling into
action this constitutional capacity." Id. at 73. Without such a law, the ambassador could not avail
himself of Supreme Court jurisdiction. See id.
79. See Territorial Rights-Florida, supra note 51, at 69.
80. See id. at 68-69.
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
82. Territorial Rights-Florida, supra note 51, at 69 (emphasis added).
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must be brought in federal court, a statement one might expect if it was
understood that law of nations cases always belonged in federal court.
Lee served in the Adams Administration and could not have been unaware of the heated debate between Federalists and Republicans over
the power of federal courts to prosecute common law crimes. 83 Put
briefly, Republicans strongly opposed the use of federal courts to prosecute common law crimes, claiming that Federalists intended to absorb
all state court powers into the federal courts.8 4 Thus, it is not surprising
that when a Republican administration took over, the new Attorney
General, Levi Lincoln, provided a more detailed resolution of the same
problem addressed by Lee.
Lincoln issued a response to the Spanish Ambassador's request that
the federal government punish U.S. citizens "involv[ed in] a highhanded breach of the peace, an outrageous riot, and an aggravated violation of the law of nations. 8 6 Like Lee, Lincoln found himself without
statutory authorization from Congress to prosecute the violation of the
law of nations so he turned to the court's common law powers to apply
the law of nations. Unlike Lee, however, Lincoln did not accept that
federal courts could adjudicate common law crimes. Therefore, he referred the Spanish Ambassador to state courts, pointing out that "the
law of nations is considered a part of the municipal law of each State.
Their courts must be competent to animadvert on the above stated offences .... I doubt the competency of the federal courts, there being no

statute recognizing the offence. 8 7
While one commentator attributes Lincoln's opinion to political posturing and calls it "completely in contradiction" with previous Federalist
opinions, 8 it is important to emphasize that this opinion did not really
differ in substance from those of his Federalist predecessors.
Randolph's opinion indicates that Congress can alter the application of
the law of nations by statute and that the Executive is bound to follow
83. For a useful discussion of the historical context for debates over the federal common law
crimes, see Stewart Jay, The Origins of FederalCommon Law, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1244-46
(1985) [hereinafter Origins].

84. See Jay, Law of Nations, supra note 26, at 842. Jay notes that these Republican claims
were almost certainly overstated for political effect. See also Jay, Origins, supra note 83, at 1244-

46. Still, there seems little reason to doubt the Republicans' sincere concerns about federal courts
prosecuting common law crimes.

85. See Insult to the Spanish Minister, 5Op. Att'y Gen. 691 (1804).
86. Id. at 692.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Jay, Law of Nations, supra note 26, at n. 115 (noting that this opinion was made shortly

after "heated debates in Congress over nonstatutory federal offenses ... [but] completely in contradiction to earlier opinions by Federalist Attorneys General") (cited in Stephens, supra note 2,
atn. 113).
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Congress's explicit instructions even if its instructions require violations
of the law of nations. Lee developed an alternative remedy for those
diplomats faced with the problem of what to do when Congress makes
no authorization. Lee concluded that in the absence of Congressional
action, the Executive may prosecute suits under the law of nations at
common law only. But if one believes, as the Republican Lincoln almost assuredly believed, that the federal courts should have no power to
try common law prosecutions, it makes sense to refer frustrated foreigners to state courts: the remaining forum for adjudicating claims under
the common law.
Admittedly, Lincoln's views appear to go beyond his Federalist
predecessors by referring foreign diplomats to state courts, but it is
worth noting that it was Lincoln's view that was eventually vindicated
by the Supreme Court. First, the Supreme Court rejected the power of
federal courts to prosecute common law crimes in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin.8 9 Then, in United States v. Coolidge, the Court extended Hudson's holding to encompass federal court prosecutions under
the law of nations. 90 While it is true that the Court was divided on the
question of Coolidge,91 it is important to note that neither Hudson and

Goodwin nor Coolidge was ever repudiated.92
In sum, the Attorney General opinions reveal that the early presidential administrations deferred to Congress's judgment on the proper application of the law of nations and the allocation of jurisdiction over
these types of cases. Moreover, in the absence of congressional action,
violations of the law of nations could only be pursued at common law.
Under one plausible view of federal court powers, these prosecutions
could only be brought in state courts. This view was ultimately sustained by the Supreme Court. This analysis is consistent with the idea
that Congress's political judgments would dominate the interpretation
and allocation of cases involving the law of nations, and that sometimes,

89. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
90. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 415,416 (1816).
91. In Coolidge, Justice Story upheld the prosecution under the law of nations in Circuit Court,

but the Attorney General refused to appear at the Supreme Court argument claiming that he had
been informed that the majority of the Court had already decided to reverse Justice Story's Circuit
Court decision and rule that Hudson controlled the case. See 14 U.S. at 415.
92. Some scholars have claimed that Hudson and Goodwin and Coolidge should be given little

weight because of their highly politicized context. See Stephens, supra note 2, at n. 105 (citing
scholarship explaining Hudson as result of political factors). I believe that, at the very least, these
cases provide the necessary intellectual framework to understand Lincoln's conclusion that law of
nations suits at common law could not be brought in federal courts and that they show his conclusion was a plausible outcome in the Founding and post-Founding era.
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Congress's failure to act left the application of the law of nations to the
state courts.
E.

The Courts

The 1790s were a turbulent period in the United States because of
ongoing wars in Europe. The problems of dealing with the war, already
recognized at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, spawned
two lines of litigation involving the law of nations. The first line involved prosecutions related to the Neutrality Proclamation, which was
issued by Washington shortly after full-scale war broke out in Europe.
The second line involved the infractions against diplomats spurred by
war-related passions that were the subject of so many Attorney General
opinions. The attitude of federal courts toward the law of nations shows
that they did not share the Attorney Generals' level of Congressional
deference and reflects the substantial confusion over how much power
federal courts can exercise in the absence of Congressional action.
1.

Neutrality Cases

Almost immediately after taking office, President Washington issued
the Neutrality Proclamation, declaring that the United States would remain neutral in the increasingly furious war between Revolutionary
France and the rest of Europe. The Proclamation was not popular because of substantial public sympathy for France, the new nation's erstwhile ally, and because it banned American participation in the war. In
particular, this limited the ability of American privateers to profit from
seizing British ships on behalf of France.
Prosecutions under the Proclamation immediately raised hard constitutional questions for the newly established federal courts. The most
relevant question for the discussion here is whether the President and
the Courts, acting together, could prosecute and convict citizens for
violating the terms of the Neutrality Proclamation without congressional
authorization. Putting aside the President's ability to declare neutrality,
the question for federal courts was reduced to whether a federal court
had jurisdiction over a violation of the law of nations, as defined solely
by the President's Neutrality Proclamation.
The first test came in the celebrated prosecution of Gideon Henfield,
an American sailor who had acted as a privateer on behalf of the
French.93 Because the United States government sought to demonstrate
to the anti-French nations that it was committed to prosecuting citizens
93. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1099.
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who took sides in the conflict, the grand jury and jury charges became
publicly distributed, and probably were drafted for public consumption.
The legal challenge for the prosecutions is the same framework that
the Attorney General opinions addressed: when Congress has not acted,
where is the authority for a federal court prosecution? The Supreme
Court justices who tried Henfield each offered a slightly different theory
justifying the prosecution.
In a previous, similar grand jury charge, Chief Justice Jay expressed
the broadest possible reading of federal jurisdiction over the law of nations. He categorized the law of nations, along with treaties, the Constitution and federal statutes, as one of the major types of the laws of the
United States.9 4 Although he did not articulate his precise textual theory,
it is possible that Jay understood the law of nations to fall within the
phrase "the laws of the United States" in Article I1.95 Under this reading, Jay could then rely on statutes authorizing punishments of crimes
"within the cognizance of the courts of the United States." 96 Thus, Jay
did not reach the question addressed by Lee and Lincoln - whether federal courts could prosecute a law of nations violation under its common
law powers - because he did not see the law of nations as a "part" of the
common law.
Even if this is a correct reading of Jay's views, it does not mean that
the original understanding necessarily rejects the "law of nations as
general common law" theory. After all, in the grand jury instructions of
the actual Henfield prosecution, Judge Wilson justified Henfield's
prosecution purely on the theory that the law of nations is part of the
97
common law, and the common law is cognizable in federal courts.
Explaining that the common law is a "social system of jurisprudence"
freely choosing from other sources of law to apply, he includes the law
of nations in this latter group. 98 "For that law in its full extent is adopted
by [the common law]. The infractions
of that law form a part of her
99
jurisprudence."
criminal
code of
Both Jay and Wilson, however, appeared to have far fewer concerns
about acting without congressional authorization than the Attorneys
General. Still, the epilogue to this case limits the precedential value of
their opinions. The jury refused to convict Henfield, perhaps because, as
then Secretary of State Jefferson believed, the jury did not believe it
94. See I IF. Cas. at 1120.

95. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48, discussing the implausibility of this view.
96.
97.
98.
99.

11F. Cas. at 1102.
See id. at 1107
Id.
Id.
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proper to convict Henfield for violating a legal rule of which he claimed
ignorance. 100 Embarrassed and fearing future judicial disasters involving
the law of nations, President Washington immediately sought express
Congressional authority to prosecute violations of the Neutrality Proclamation. His request was promptly granted, and Congress enacted the
law pursuant to its Article I, section 8 powers, ending the debate over
the legality of the Henfield prosecution.
2.

Diplomat Cases

Judicial opinions in cases involving diplomats reflect much less disagreement on the respective roles of Congress and the federal courts. In
Ex Parte Cabrera,the federal circuit court for Pennsylvania received a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in favor of a Spanish diplomat arrested and imprisoned pursuant to a warrant issued by the Governor of
Pennsylvania. 0 2 Justice Washington began by declaring "it ...cannot
be denied, but that he is under the protection of the law of nations; and
to the tribunals of this country, upon a civil or criminal
is not amenable
03
charge."1
This determination, however, did not resolve the harder question of
whether a federal court had jurisdiction "to discharge from confinement,
any person, no matter what may be his character or privileges; committed by a warrant from the governor, or any judicial magistrate, of this
state."' 04 Conceding that under federal statute any suit against a qualified diplomat was null and void, the court still refused to issue the
writ.105 Justice Washington's analysis of the problem and his attitude
toward the balance between state and federal courts in this sensitive law
of nations case is revealing.
Either ...the federal circuit or the state court; might entertain
jurisdiction of a suit, brought to redress the injury ....But, I

apprehend, that neither court can dictate to the other, the
conduct it shall pursue, or interfere in causes there depending,
unless properly brought before it, under the provisions of
law. 106

100. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress, 1793-1795, 63
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 15 n. 61 (1996) (citing letter from Jefferson); see also Henfield's Case, 11 F.
Cas. at 1123 n. 7.
101. See Currie, supra note 100, at 15.
102. Ex Parte Cabrera, 4 F. Cas. 964 (No. 2,278) (C.C.D. Pa. 1805).
103. Id.at 965.
104. Id.
105. See id.at 964.
106. Id. at 965-66.
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Justice Washington recognized that the lack of federal remedy in
such a case seemed a strange result given the admitted violations of the
law of nations. However, that was not a decision for the courts. Justice
Washington explained: "whether it would have been wise in congress,
to have vested in the national courts, the power of deciding, in some
way or other, every national question, authorized by the constitution[] is
another point." 10 7 The federal court thus found itself powerless to free a
diplomat who is being held in violation of the law of nations.
A few years later, the same justice faced a similar question in a case
involving the assault on another Spanish diplomat.1°8 Here, the defendant, an American citizen, claimed that he did not know the victim was
a diplomat and, therefore, that he did not knowingly violate the law of
nations. Accepting that an unknowing assault on a diplomat does not
violate the law of nations, the court nevertheless held that the statute 09
the same statute considered in Ex parte Cabrera1
- criminalized all assaults on foreign diplomats regardless of whether such assaults could be
said to violate the law of nations.' 10
Speculating on the importance of federal courts for dealing with
questions of "peace and honour," the court guessed that it is "probable"
that Congress would occupy as much jurisdiction permitted by the Constitution and leave "no part of the subject of the cognisance [sic] of state
tribunals.""' Though the court ended up proceeding with the case, this
analysis supports my broader claim that federal courts still looked to
Congress (or Congress's intentions) as the ultimate source for deciding
how questions the law of nations will be handled by courts.
If the law of nations were part of a federal court's general powers to
adjudicate matters of federal law, it seems odd that a federal court could
not free the illegally-held Spanish diplomat in Ex parte Cabrera112 and
that the interpretation of a question involving the scope of the law of
nations was subordinated to Congress's judgment. It is thus important to
recognize that the court's actions in these two cases were inconsistent
with a broad federal power to adjudicate any case involving the law of
nations.

107. Id. at 966.

108. See United States v. Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936, 937 (No. 15,598) (C.C.D. Pa. 1808).
109. 4 F. Cas. at 964.
110. See 26 F. Cas. at 937-38.
111. Id. at 938.
112. 4 F. Cas. at 964.
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Summary

This above discussion suggests that the Founders intended to solve
the problem of state courts and the law of nations by giving Congress
the authority to create a federal court system with jurisdictionalcompetence over certain kinds of cases that implicate foreign relations. It
was for Congress to decide, through its statutory incorporation of the
law of nations and its manipulation of federal jurisdiction, how the law
of nations would be used in the American legal system. When Congress
did not act, either through its powers to erect jurisdictional barriers or
through its powers to codify the law of nations, a case requiring the application of the law of nations would belong to the state courts.
To be sure, the Founding generation offered conflicting opinions
about how the law of nations was to be used in the judicial system. At
one extreme, John Jay seemed to believe that the law of nations was incorporated into the system through the Constitution's reference to laws
of the United States. Jay's views on this point must be read, however,
alongside indications that other members of the Founding generation,
not to mention the first Congress and the first Attorneys General, agreed
that the law of nations was a part of the general common law. The assumption that the law of nations is part of the general common law,
subject to congressional revisions, meant that other members of the
Founding generation assumed the law of nations would be a rule for decision in state as well as federal courts but controlled by neither.
Given the disagreements among the Founders, it may be impossible
to authoritatively determine the "original understanding" of the place of
CIL in the American legal system. The creation of two overlapping
court systems was largely unprecedented and it should not surprise us if
the Founders themselves did not fully understand the way in which their
newfangled judicial system would operate in practice. At the very least,
however, the historical sources discussed in this part create strong
doubts about the broad claims, made on behalf of the nationalist view,
that the Founders' intended to federalize all cases involving the law of
nations. As I have argued, the statements of important Founders (like
Hamilton), the actions of the first Congress, the legal opinions of the
first Attorneys General, and the reasoning adopted by contemporary
federal courts strongly suggest otherwise.
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III. STATE COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

This part surveys four113 areas of CIL doctrine: diplomatic immunity
in transit, the irregular abduction of overseas fugitives, foreign sovereign immunity and the restrictions on contacts between enemy aliens.
Even though these doctrines were (and are) understood to be part of
CIL, cases invoking these doctrines often ended up in state courts without the possibility of federal court review. This discussion of how state
courts contributed to the development of these doctrines reveals a system alien to the nationalist vision; a regime where state courts often
controlled the interpretation, application, and development of CIL.
This regime is significant for at least two reasons. First, the historical
existence of a regime dominated by state court interpretations of CIL
casts even more doubt on the historical foundations for the nationalist
view. While I do not deny the attractiveness of the nationalist view as a
matter of modem judicial policy, this part's historical discussion confirms the conclusions of Part I and reveals that there is significantly less
historical support for the nationalist view than many scholars have
claimed.
Second, the operation of a state-dominated CIL regime offers a model
for how the general common law regime succeeded in producing relatively uniform or determinate doctrines of CIL. Though state courts interpretations of CIL doctrines were not subject to federal court review,
the general common law CIL regime rarely created splits between different state systems or with the federal system. Instead, the first courts
to consider CIL questions relied heavily on international law treatises in
reaching their decisions and their interpretations were accorded great
deference by other state courts. This resulted in relatively uniform ap-

113. By concentrating on these four doctrines, I do not in anyway imply that these are the only
customary international law doctrines that were developed by state courts operating in the general
common law regime. My goal by examining these doctrines is to describe a regime in action
rather than attempt a comprehensive survey of all CIL doctrines in U.S. and state courts. Other
prominent examples of CIL doctrines include property rules governing the transfer of sovereignty, the rights of consular officials to assert estate rights on behalf of resident aliens, and the
limitations on an enemy alien's ability to sue. See, e.g., Willard L. Boyd, Consular Functions in
Connection with Decedent's Estates, 47 IOWA L. REV. 823 (1962) (reviewing law governing con-

sular functions in the several states); Franck C. Sterck & Carl J. Schuck, The Right of Resident
Alien Enemies to Sue, 30 GEO. L.J. 421, 423-24 n.18 (1942) (reviewing status of the law of war's
limits on suits by aliens in the different states); Philip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 3 UCLA L. REv. 665, 686 n.72 (1986) (discussing the number of state
court cases involving the law of nations governing property rights after the transfer of sovereignty). Nothing in the state court treatment of these doctrines, however, seems to differ substantially with the analysis I provide in this part.
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plications of the CIL doctrines that I will discuss. This is not to say that
disagreements between courts did not exist. However, my account also
shows that representatives of the President or Congress, and not federal
court decisions, served as the unifying institution to guide judicial application of CIL.
A.

Immunity for Ambassadors and Public Ministers in Transit

It is surprising to find that the development of CIL rules governing
diplomats has occurred mainly in state courts. After all, the Founding
generation specifically sought to federalize jurisdiction over "all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, Public Ministers and Consuls"' 1 4 by granting
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over such cases and granting
Congress the authority to give the lower federal courts jurisdiction over
these cases. To be sure, Congress immediately acted to give federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits and prosecutions brought
against ambassadors, public ministers,115 and consuls., 16 But they left a
few doors open and litigants pushed their way through.
For instance, the question of whether ambassadors and public ministers, serving in other countries, but traveling in the United States, held
diplomatic immunity remained unresolved. The first Congress acted 117
to
nullify lawsuits brought against ambassadors and public ministers.
The statute specified that it would void process involving ambassadors
and ministers "authorized and received as such by the President."' 18
Ambassadors and public ministers traveling through the United States
en route to other countries were not received and recognized by the
President and did not appear to be covered by the statute's protections. 19
'
The first reported case of a court wrestling with this apparent loophole arose in New York City. In Holbrook, Nelson & Co. v.

Henderson,12 a minister of the then-independent Republic of Texas, ac114. U.S. CONST. art. III, §. 2.
115. See Judiciary Act, supra note 60, at § 13(b).
116. See id.at § 9(c).
117. See Act of April 30, 1790, supra note 75, at § 25 (nullifying "any writ or process" in any
federal or state court against an ambassador or public minister "authorized and received as such
by the President").
118. Id.
119. Curiously, federal law appeared to grant the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over
all suits against ambassadors and ministers. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction was limited to suits
brought "consistent with the law of nations," but this should not have deprived it ofjurisdiction
over suits where the law of nation's protections were unclear. See Judiciary Act of 1789, supra
note 60, at § 13.
120. 4 Sandf. 619 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1839).
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credited by both France and England, was held under civil process in a
New York court. The record showed that the minister, Henderson, was
passing through New York while carrying a treaty from France back to
Texas. Henderson claimed that he was immune from process under the
federal statute, but the City of New York's Superior Court noted that
121 the
States.
United
the
in
serving
diplomats
to
limited
was
1790
Act of
We might expect that having found that the federal statute did not
protect Henderson, the court would have allowed the lawsuit to go forward. But Chief Justice Oakley looked for other sources of law, and like
so many jurists of his time, he turned to a leading treatise on the law of
nations:
According to Vattel's opinion, then, the principles of international law on which the rights and privileges of resident ministers rest, apply to a case like the one now before us, so far as
to secure to the minister ... from all restraint of his personal

liberty, whereby he may be prevented from discharging his
duties to his own sovereign.
What is particularly striking about Oakley's opinion to the modem
reader is that he acted without any statutory authority from either Congress or the legislature of New York, and without any precedential
guidance from the Supreme Court of the United States or any federal
court. He relied entirely on his reading of international law treatises
(which he admitted were not in agreement with each other) 123 in order to
"create" a rule of CIL for the New York courts.
Although there do not appear to be any reported cases in other states
at the time, the judgment could easily have been different in another
court because American commentators of the period noted that the
question of diplomatic immunity in transit was not settled. 124 In fact, the
United States government appeared to take a position different from that
of the New York courts in 1855, when the Attorney General issued an
opinion in response to criminal charges against a diplomat from Nicaragua, French, who was supposedly on his way to present his credentials

121. See 4 Sanf. at 628.

122. Id. at 630.
123. Oakley noted that Grotius and Wicquefort, two respected but older authorities on inter-

national law, did not believe a minister passing through the territory of a third power had any
privileges. See id. at 631.
124. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 244 (1866) (noting "[t]he

opinion of public jurists appears to be somewhat divided upon the question" of diplomats in transit); THEODORE WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 97 at 245
(6th ed. 1884) (observing a division between treatise writers).
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to the President.1 25 The opinion explained that because the diplomat had
not yet been accredited, "any diplomatic privilege accorded to him is of
mere transit, and of courtesy, not, of right.... 99126 Therefore, such a
courtesy could be withdrawn at any time.If
Despite this apparently contrary authority from the Executive Branch
(which may not have been widely reported), Oakley's opinion proved
sufficiently durable so that a half-century later, the same New York
court applied the rule in Holbrook128 not only to quash service of process, but also to vacate a judgment issued against a Venezuelan envoy en
route to France. 12 This application of the Holbrook rule is arguably
more aggressive than either Holbrook or Vattel requires. The rationale
for Vattel's rule is that a diplomat deserves only the liberty necessary to
fulfill his duties, and is not entitled to all of the privileges of a resident
ambassador. Yet, the Wilson court essentially held that a diplomat in
transit can avoid all adverse judgments, even those judicial processes
that do not
necessarily prevent him from making his way through the
30
country. 1
Another thirty-five years would pass before a New York court returned to the question. In Carbone v. Carbone, the manner in which
Wilson extended Holbrook was rejected.13 1 In the case, a diplomat of
Panama en route to his post in Italy sought to vacate an arrest order and
service of summons in an action for divorce. Noting again that federal
statutes left the diplomat without protection, the Carbone court held that
a third country through which a diplomat was passing through in fulfilling his official duties "owes him only the duty not to prevent him
from discharging his diplomatic function by restraint on his personal
liberty."' 132 Thus, while the arrest order was vacated, the court allowed
the service of summons to stand on the
theory that the diplomat could
33
still fulfill his duties while being sued.
All this time, it appears that no federal courts were involved in developing what can only be called an emerging rule of CIL. The rule was far
125. See Diplomatic Privilege, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 473 (1855).
126. Id. (emphasis added).

127. The tone of the opinion is rather threatening. It asserts a right to prosecute French for any
crimes, but ultimately instructs the local U.S. attorney to drop the charges on the condition that
French depart immediately. See id. at 474.
128. 4 Sandf. at619.

129. See Wilson v. Blanco, 4 N.Y.S. 714, 1889 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1681, **1 (affirming
opinion of special term).
130. See id.
at **3.
131. Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc. 656, 657, 206 N.Y.S. 40, 41-42 (1924).
132. Id. at 657, 206 N.Y.S. at 41-42.

133. See id at 657, 206 N.Y.S. at 41-42.
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from widely accepted overseas. 134 Commentators continued to disagree
on the same issue that divided the Wilson and Carbone courts. 135 In the

meantime, the State Department appeared to have adopted the Holbrook
rule for all unaccredited diplomats. In a letter of March 1, 1906 to the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor, the Secretary of State declared that
"diplomatic agents, whether accredited or not to the United States,
should be exempt from the operation of the municipal law.. ." by virtue
of the law of nations. 136 However, this letter failed to describe in detail
how much immunity
the State Department was prepared to give to. dip137
transit.
in
lomats

Finally, the diplomatic immunity-in-transit question was presented to
a federal court in 1946. 38 The treatment of this issue in federal courts is
worth discussing in detail because it reveals how the general common

law regime came under pressure after the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Erie
v. Tompkins that declared "there is no general federal
139
law."'
common

The case involved a suit against Jacques DeSieyes, the accredited
French minister to Bolivia, in New York state court. The case was then
removed to the U.S. District Court, on the basis of diversity of citizenship. It was there that DeSieyes raised his immunity defense. Like the
New York courts, the district court found that no federal statute was
controlling because
DeSieyes had not been received by the President as
0

a minister.14

Although it did not spell out the nature of its authority to declare CIL,
the district court appeared to follow the pattern established during the

general common law regime. It reviewed a number of different authori-

134. See 4 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 402 (1942)
(noting 1930 communication indicating British government's uncertainty of whether U.S. Ambassador to Spain would receive immunity from a libel suit in Britain.); I L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 398 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (describing Cuba's
1917 arrest of German diplomat in transit); 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 644 (1906) (describing problems of acquiring safe passage through Brazil for U.S. diplomats stationed in Paraguay).
135. Compare HARVARD LAW SCH., RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, DIPLOMATIC
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES art. 15 (1932) (supporting innocent passage but implying no immunity from civil suits) and OPPENHEIM, supra note 134, § 385 (same) with Convention on Diplomatic Officers, Treaties and Conventions Signed at the Sixth International Conference of
American States, February 20, 1928, arts. 19 & 23, Law and Treaty Series No. 34, at 12-13
(making no distinction between diplomats in residence and diplomas in transit.).
136. 4 HACKWORTH, supra note 134, §400 at 513.
137. See id.
138. Bergman v. DeSieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
139. 304 U.S. at 78.
140. See 71 F. Supp. at 335.
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ties on the law of nations, including English common law, international
law treatises, American State Department practice, and the trio of New
York cases that had considered the issue. It observed that some of the
authorities did not fully agree on the extent of diplomatic immunity
available in transit. But none of these sources of CIL were considered to
be more authoritative than the other. For instance, after reviewing these
authorities, the court stated:
The foregoing seem to be the principal sources to which one
must look in his endeavor to ascertain the [Ilaw of [n]ations,
as it stands today, with reference to the question here involved. The Magdalena and Holbrook cases are especially
important, for they contain very full and well reasoned discussions of the immunities and privileges of foreign ministers
and the reasons for their existence. 141
It is interesting for our purposes that the Magdalena case, 14 decided
by a British court in 1859, and the Holbrook case 143 appeared to have
equal but not greater persuasive authority. This attitude toward common
law authority is characteristic of the general common law regime where
each court system looks to others as persuasive but not binding authorities. Under Erie, the district court arguably should have been bound by
the New York state court decision. However, the district court did not
consider this possibility and instead followed the traditional general
common law method.
Given the conflict among the authorities, the district court found it
difficult to reach a particular outcome. It eventually concluded that a
diplomat "is entitled to innocent passage through a third country" and
"the same immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the third
country that he would have if he were resident therein."' The court
recognized that this conclusion went farther than the Carbone court, but
it relied heavily on the "better considered Holbrook case," as well as recent non-binding declarations made during a conference of North and
South American states to the same effect. Characteristic of the general common law regime, the court considered both federal political
branch statements and persuasive common law decisions to fashion an
interpretation of CIL.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.at 341.
Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin, 121 Eng. Rep. 36 (1859).
4 Sanf. at 619.
71 F. Supp. at 341 (emphasis added).
71 F. Supp at341.
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The plaintiff appealed and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit took up the case. 146 Written by Chief Judge Learned
Hand, the panel decision recognized the possible collision between the
Erie doctrine and the general common law regime. 147 It observed that
because the federal courts sat in diversity jurisdiction in this case, New
York courts' "interpretation of international law is controlling upon us,
and we are to follow them so far as they have declared themselves.' 4a
Commentators espousing the nationalist view have criticized Judge
Hand's holding in Bergman, arguing that it is an isolated decision of
limited scope149 and one of Judge Hand's few mistakes.' It is certainly
true that Judge Hand dodged the harder issue of "[w]hether an avowed
refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of international law, or a
plain misapprehension of it, would present a federal question,"'' but it
is hard to reconcile his approach with the nationalist view. After all,
why bother to follow New York law at all if, as many nationalist commentators assume today, CIL is part of federal common law?
Still, Judge Hand's decision hardly settles the question of how federal
courts should treat the status of CIL. Finding the state of New York law
to be uncertain and other international law authorities to be in conflict,
he eventually affirmed the district court decision based more on his own
practical reasoning of what New York courts would hold rather than on
explicit adherence to New York law. 152
For my purposes, it is important to emphasize that no less an authority than Judge Hand found state courts to be a useful (and indeed, in this
case, potentially authoritative) source of CIL interpretation. Though
questions involving diplomatic immunity necessarily implicate foreign
affairs, he did not reach for what nationalist commentators would view
as the obvious argument for rejecting the state court decisions; he did
not argue that federal courts have any greater ability to interpret CIL
than state courts due to their position as "national" courts. Instead, he
146. Bergman v. DeSieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
147. See id. at 361.
148. Id.
149. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 440 n. 243. See also Bradford R. Clark, FederalCommon
Law: A StructuralReinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1317-21 (1996).
150. See Koh's discussion of Bergman, supra note 2, at n.46 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 410 n.21 (2d ed. 1996)). Although Henkin's

pre-eminence as an international law scholar is unquestioned, his analysis of Bergman is not
really buttressed significantly by the fact that he once served as Judge Hand's law clerk.
151. 170F.2dat361.
152. He reasoned that diplomats in transit actually need more immunity from civil process
because they are less likely to fulfill their diplomatic duties if obligated to respond to civil suit in
a third country. See id. at 363.
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limited his analysis to what "the courts of New York would today
hold" 153 and relied on the same sources that are characteristic of the
general common law regime, such as English common law, international law treatises, and state court decisions.
More significantly, it appears that the political branches afforded
Hand's decision no greater weight than the New York decisions. In
1949, the State Department issued an opinion letter on this question that
actually relied on the more limited New York rule in Carbone without
mentioning the much more recent decision by the federal courts in
Bergman.14 Opining that a diplomat in transit deserves the right of innocent passage, the Legal Adviser flatly rejected equating the rights of
diplomats in transit with the rights of diplomats in residence. 55 Instead,
he relied on the more modest ruling in Carbone saying "[i]t is believed
that the recognized principles
of International Law support the conclu'1 56
sion reached by the court."
Eventually, this view was codified as federal law when the United
157
States entered into the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Therefore, the issue of how to treat this question of diplomatic immunity was not federalized until the political branches of the federal government acted.
This sketch of the diplomatic immunity in transit rule describes how a
question of CIL was developed almost exclusively by state courts without definitive rulings by federal courts or guidance by the political
branches. Indeed, the rule began in a state court decision that provided
more diplomatic protection than Congress had required by statute and
than the President's representatives were prepared to grant. In the general common law regime, the state courts were considered competent to
opine on the proper scope of immunity for a diplomat in transit. Even
after federal courts entered onto the scene, the federal appellate court's
ruling limited itself to stating what it considered to be New York law.
Any strong claims of historical support for the nationalist58view, therefore, need to take better account of this historical narrative.
153. Id.
154. 7 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 10 (1970) (Letter from Legal Adviser, Fisher, to U.S. Attorney General McGrath, Sept. 27, 1949).
155. See id.
156. Id.

157. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 34, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.S.T.S. 95 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 251-59 (1994).

158. Some nationalist commentators have discussed, and rejected, Bergman. See, e.g., Koh,
supra note 2, at 1833 n. 46; Stephens, supra note 2, at 440 n. 243. Neither of these commentators, however, have adequately explained why the rule of diplomatic immunity in transit arose out
of New York law in the first place.
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The ability of state courts to develop relatively uniform and acceptable rules of CIL is noteworthy. Despite some disagreements between
the different New York courts and New York's differences with the position of the political branches, the courts actually provided useful guidance for CIL development that other international law authorities could
not. Therefore, it is not surprising that the executive branch eventually
relied, in part, upon a New York court's interpretation of CIL to formulate the U.S. government's position internationally and followed
New York when it federalized this point of law.
B.

IrregularAbduction of Overseas Fugitives: The Ker Doctrine

If a defendant is kidnapped or otherwise abducted from a foreign
country, the general rule in American courts authorizes courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction if the other jurisdictional requirements have
been satisfied. Though not always recognized as such, this rule, often
known today as Ker-Frisbie,159 is a doctrine of CIL, as well as one of
domestic law because courts considering an abducted defendant must
consider whether that abduction violates CIL. If it does, a court must
then consider whether CIL confers upon the defendant a judiciallyenforced remedy. Defendants challenging their convictions argue that
courts cannot assert jurisdiction over a defendant seized in violation of
CIL.
Like the diplomatic immunity in transit rule, this doctrine actually
originated in a state, rather than a federal, court decision. One of the
earliest reported decisions on this subject, in fact, dates from the Supreme Court of Vermont in 1835."' I discuss its reasoning in some detail in order to demonstrate its effect on later decisions.
The case involved Brewster, a Canadian subject, who was charged
with burglary and stealing leather within the jurisdiction of the State of
Vermont. Brewster had fled to Canada shortly after the crime, but he
was pursued, forcibly seized, and brought back to Vermont by private
citizens of Vermont. Brewster appealed his conviction to the Supreme
Court of Vermont, arguing that the manner of his abduction deprived
his trial court of proper jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court rejected this argument.

159. The rule is often referred to as the Ker Frisbie rule because of two important Supreme
Court decisions applying this rule. As this section will explain, however, neither Ker nor Frisbie
actually originated the rule in American courts. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
160. State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835).
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First, the Vermont Supreme Court refused to adopt Brewster's proposed rule of CIL, which confers an immunity from punishment based
upon one's refuge in a foreign country. 16 1 If such immunity from punishment existed, the court reasoned, then a foreign country that voluntarily surrendered an individual sought by another country would also
violate CIL. 162 Given the common nature 163of this practice, the court
found no basis for adopting this rule of CIL.
Next, the court pointed out that the alleged offense occurred within
the boundaries of the State of Vermont and therefore Vermont courts
had jurisdiction over the crime.164 The court did recognize that had
Brewster committed his crime in Canada, "the law of nations would
have afforded
a protection which this court would be bound to re' 65
spect."'

Finally, the court admitted that Brewster's abduction may very well
have constituted a violation of Canada's sovereignty, and therefore,
constituted a violation of CIL. 166 But the court held that no judicial
remedy for such a CIL violation exists because that is a "matter which
concerns the political relations of the two countries, and in that aspect is
a subject not within the constitutional powers of this court."'16 7 In other
words, not every admitted violation of CIL is judicially enforceable, an
important theme in understanding the development of this doctrine.
The holding in Brewster was independently reached by the superior
court of Buffalo, New York in 1868.1 68 In that case, a Buffalo lawenforcement officer, in cooperation with a Canadian officer but without
any other official sanction by the Canadian authorities, forcibly dragged
a fugitive from the Canadian side of a bridge to the American side. The
New York court agreed that the act of forcibly removing the defendant
could have violated the sovereignty of Canada. Like the Brewster court,
however, the Rowe court found that the remedy for that possible violation of CIL was "an international one, and cannot arise unless her Majesty's 6government
shall see fit to lay the matter before our govern9
ment."'

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id.at 120.
See id.
See id.at 121-22.
See id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
See id. at 121.
Id. at 121-22.
See I JOHN BASSETT MOORE, EXTRADITION AND INTER-STATE RENDITION § 201 (1891)

(discussing and quoting from People of New York v. Rowe).
169. Id.
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The Supreme Court of the City of New York followed this holding in
1873. 17 In this case, the New York court had to consider a habeas petition seeking to enforce a claimed violation of the U.S. extradition treaty
with France. According to the court, an American fugitive who is extradited by the French authorities for a crime not authorized by the treaty
essentially had been "wrongfully seized" and kidnapped. 17' Even
though the court had the authority under its habeas powers to discharge
the defendant, it cited Rowe as authority for affirming the court's criminal jurisdiction. 172 After all, even if the defendant had been kidnapped,
his presence within the jurisdiction of the court made him the subject of
any otherwise lawful prosecution. Without explicitly saying so, the
court found that the extradition treaty did not encompass the type of
burglary for which he was indicted. 173 The defendant's only possible
claim arose under CIL. 174 Unfortunately for the defendant, the court
in Brewheld that this claim was also subject to the same rule adopted
175
defendants.
the
discharge
to
refused
and
ster and Rowe,
In 1884, the Supreme Court of the United States finally considered
the propriety of the rule announced in Brewster. The case involved the
irregular abduction of defendant Ker from the Republic of Peru by a
private bounty hunter. Ker was brought to Illinois for trial, where he
was charged with committing larceny. Ker first sued for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court claiming his abduction deprived the Illinois court
of jurisdiction, but he was denied relief. 176 Ker was eventually convicted
in trial court and he appealed his conviction on the same irregular abduction theory to the177Supreme Court of Illinois and the Supreme Court
of the United States.
The Ker v. Illinois178 case is often cited for the proposition that "the
power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that
he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a forcible abduction."' 179 But the Ker court did not actually adopt that rule as a
matter of federal law. A careful reading of the Ker court's holding reveals that CIL was understood to operate simply as another part of the
§ 202 (discussing In the Matter ofAifred E. LaGrave).
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. This analysis of the extradition treaty was rejected in a later U.S. Supreme Court decision. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
174. See MOORE, supra note 168, at § 202.
175. Seeid.
176. Ex Parte Ker, 18 F. 167 (1883).
177. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
178. Id.
179. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 444 (1886)).
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general common law and was accorded no special status even when its
interpretations by state courts seemed to implicate foreign relations.
Ker had raised three separate arguments in state court as to why his
abduction required the reversal of his conviction. First, he argued that
his abduction violated the federal constitution's guarantee of due process. This argument, raising a constitutional question, triggered the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under section 25 of the Judiciary
Act and the Court quickly dismissed the constitutional argument by
pointing out that due process rights could only be asserted against procedures by which he was tried and convicted, and
not against how he
80
was brought within the jurisdiction of the court. 1
Second, Ker argued that the extradition treaty with Peru gave him the
right to be free from arrest by American authorities except through the
procedures laid out in the extradition treaty. Because a treaty is also a
federal question, the Court found it had appellate jurisdiction over this
question as well. 181 It rejected this argument by pointing out that nothing in the treaty confers a private right of "asylum" upon individuals
entering a foreign country.' 2After all, those countries could voluntarily
surrender any foreigner found within their borders as an exercise of
comity. 183
The Court distinguished Rauscher,184 handed down the same day,
which permitted a defendant to assert extradition treaty rights to block
judicial process. Unlike the defendant in Rauscher, the Court argued,
Ker was not surrendered in accordance with a treaty and therefore could
not claim the protection of rights guaranteed under the extradition
treaty. 185 In other words, the surrender of an individual in accordance
with an extradition treaty required a domestic court to comply with that
treaty as a matter of self-executing federal law. But simple abduction
did not trigger any treaty provisions.
Finally, the Court reached the question for which the decision would
be remembered: to what degree could Ker seek judicial remedies for
violations of CIL? Its discussion is worth quoting in detail:
The question of how far his forcible seizure in another country, could be made available to resist trial in the state court for
the offense now charged upon him, is one which we do not
180.
181.
182.
183.

See 119 U.S. at 439-440.
See id. at 441-442.
Id. at 442.
See id.

184. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
185. See 119 U.S. at 443.
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feel called upon to decide; for in that transaction we do not
see that the constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States guaranty him any protection. There are authorities of
the highest respectability which hold that such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which
has the right to try him for such an offense ....
However this
may be, the decision of that question is as much within the
province of the state court as a question of common law, or of
the law of nations, of which that court is bound to take notice. 186

The Court went on to emphasize that, "[a]nd though we might or might
not differ with the Illinois court on that87 subject, it is one in which we
have no right to review their decision."'
Thus, the Ker ruling did not actually endorse the trial of defendants
abducted in violation of CIL. Rather, the Ker ruling recognized that the
question of whether an individual could seek judicial remedies for violations of CIL by his abductors is a question falling within the interpretive authority of the state courts. To be sure, federal courts had tangentially wrestled with the question, but those cases, not surprisingly, all
arose in the original admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. I&When
a case arises in the original jurisdiction of a state court, however, and
even if it implicates questions of CIL and matters of foreign affairs, the
result in Ker means that the Supreme Court of the United States cannot
assert appellate jurisdiction because neither issue is a federal question
arising under the treaties, constitution, or laws of the United States.
As odd as this kind of deference to state courts may seem, as a practical matter, the Supreme Court's unwillingness to federalize the rule
governing illegal abductions did not cause a rash of inconsistent state
interpretations. The Illinois Supreme Court in Ker, citing Brewster,
adopted its reasoning to hold that any violation of CIL caused by the
abduction created no judicially enforceable private rights.' 89 Rather,

186. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).

187. Id. (emphasis added). Though other commentators have emphasized this point, the resistance to dealing with the actual holding of the Ker decision among nationalist commentators has
been strong. No commentators have offered a persuasive explanation of how CIL could be a form
of special "national" general common law when the Ker court specifically deferred this important
CIL determination to the courts of Illinois.
188. See, e.g., Richmond v. United States, 13 U.S. 102, 104 (1815) (refusing to annul admi-

ralty action because ship in question was illegally seized in violation of foreign sovereign's territory).
189. See Ker v. Illinois, 110 111. 627 (1884) (citing State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835)).
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dealing with such violations would be left to the executive branch
should Peru file a diplomatic protest. The uniformity of this rule's acceptance can be seen in a survey of subsequent state court decisions addressing similar problems.190 No state court failed to follow the Ker
state court reading of CIL even though none of these courts were bound
by the Kerfederal court decision.

The idea that state courts could validly determine the proper remedy,
or non-remedy, under CIL is consistent with the State Department's
views during the general common law regime. On a number of occasions, the abduction of citizens from foreign territory, usually Canada or
Mexico, drew angry diplomatic protests. Interestingly, if the officials
involved were acting under directions from local or state authorities, the
State Department would apologize on behalf of the United States, but it
could not guarantee compliance with the complaining foreign government's demands. For instance, in 1850, the British minister in Washington sent an official diplomatic protest to the State Department over a
Georgia sheriff's rash abduction of an American fugitive in British territory. He asked the U.S to "give orders for the release of the individual
in question, or give me assurance that no punishment will be inflicted
upon him" until further notice.' 91 The State Department responded by
forwarding the letter to the governor of Georgia and requesting that
Georgia complywith Britain's request. Similar incidents occurred in
sole remNew York and Texas and in each case the State Department's
92
edy was to request action by the governor of the state.
This regime seems exceeding strange and ineffective to modern readers (not to mention grossly unfair). Following the rule laid down in
Brewster, state courts in the general common law era refused to give judicial remedies to admitted violations of CIL involved in the kidnapping, saying that such remedies are left to the political branches. 193 Yet,
the political branch the state courts refer to, the President, often had no
independent authority to release the prisoners in order to remedy violations of CIL once a court has acquired jurisdiction. The President, therefore, could only apologize, perhaps pay compensation, and then promise
to "request" remedies. 94 It would seem that the President should have
190. See People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 141 (1961). See also 28 A.L.R. Fed. 685 § 7 ("In
all the circumstances of several cases, the courts have upheld the jurisdiction of a federal court to

try a criminal defendant who alleged that had been brought with the court's territorial jurisdiction
illegally because of his abduction from a foreign country.")
191. See MOORE, supra note 168, at § 198.
192. See id. at §§ 197, 199 (discussing cases of British subjects Winslow and Cahill).
193. See discussion in text accompanying nn. 171-186.

194. MOORE, supra note 168, at § 197. The State Department has long recognized the difficult
position that the federal system created for its ability to offer diplomatic remedies for law of na-
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authority to remedy violations of CIL committed by constituent states of
the Union. But under the general common law regime, the President
could not seek a federal court order to release the abducted foreign citizens because CIL was not considered federal law.
However strange such a regime might seem today, Congress does
possess the power to provide remedies for violations of CIL. As the
Court observed four years, later in an extradition case involving abductions between states, Congress could provide the federal government,
and the President, with such authority to remedy violations of CIL or
disputes between the states triggered by irregular abduction. 95 But for
whatever reason, Congress chose to do nothing.
Whether Congress might not provide for the compulsory restoration to the State of parties wrongfully abducted from its
territory upon application of the parties, or of the State, and
whether such provision would not greatly tend to the public
peace along the borders of the several States, are not matters
for present consideration. It is sufficient now that no means
U
9
the courts of the United States have
for such redress through
provided.
as yet been
the court eventually held, the fedWithout such statutory authorization,
197
powerless.
were
courts
eral
In contrast to the other CIL doctrines discussed in this article, the political branches never fully codified the rule first announced in Brewster, although proposals to reverse this holding through treaty were conpartially codified by
sidered.1 To some extent, these issues were
individual extradition treaties. Still, as furor over the Supreme Court's

tions, but it has often defended it with some relish against foreign critics. In a testy response to
the British minister complaining about the comparatively slow American response to demands for
a return of abducted subjects, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish lauded the British government's
ability to promptly release abducted American citizens, but tartly observed that the British system
("The
allowed more political control of courts than was permitted in the American system. See id.
power so promptly and efficiently exercised by the British government is an evidence of the inherent power to existing in the political department of that government, when it sees fit to exercise it, over the person of the individual, and in control even of the judgments of the courts.")
195. See Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 523.
196. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 705 (1888).
197. See id.
198. See Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 442
(Supp. 1935) (discussing Article 16 that offers the following suggestion: "In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any person who has been brought
within its territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States
whose rights have been violated by such measures").
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1992 decision' 99 to uphold an abduction of a Mexican citizen by federal
agents demonstrates, the uncodified Ker-Frisbie rule is alive and well
today.
Indeed, the rule authorizing trials despite admitted illegalities in
bringing the defendant to trial has never been fully rejected as a matter
of CIL by other nations. In some cases, it was adopted by courts outside
of the United States and Britain. As the State Department's official reporter of international law practice noted:
As a general matter, at least in the absence of objection on the
part of the country from which the fugitive was removed, the
courts have ruled that the manner in which the accused came
or was brought within the jurisdiction of the court is immaterial insofar as the court's jurisdiction to try and punish him is
concerned.200
Obviously, American courts follow this rule. But interestingly, the
reporter also cites the Israeli court's decision to try, convict (and execute) Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal illegally abducted from Argentina. 20 1 Thus, it can be said that, in a small way, one of the most important international human rights trials of the century embraced the
rule first laid down in this country by the Supreme Court of Vermont.
In any case, it is sufficient to observe that the general common law
regime followed a similar pattern in developing a rule for irregular abductions of overseas fugitives as it did in the case of diplomats in transit. A state court, in this case Vermont, announced a doctrine of CIL.
After a period of state court development, the Supreme Court specifically disclaims its ability to review the state of Illinois' interpretation of
CIL. At the same time, the Supreme Court adopts the rule for cases
arising independently under federal court jurisdiction. The political
branches are understood to be responsible for providing remedies for
these violations of CIL, and they can decide whether or not to create the
statutory mechanism to provide remedies for such irregular abductions.
In this case, they chose not to completely federalize the irregular abduction regime.

199. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).

200. 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1108 (1963).
201. See id.at 1111 (discussing Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf, son of

Karl Adolf Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61, Judgment, Dec. 11,
1961 (unofficial English translation), The American Embassy at Tel-Aviv to the Department of
State, despatch No. 444, Feb. 13, 1962, encl. MS. Department of State, file 662.0026/2-1362).
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C. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is based on the absolute
equality of sovereign states in the eyes of traditional international law.
While the exact scope of foreign sovereign immunity has been the subject of much dispute, modern commentators have recognized that at
least some of the immunities granted to foreign sovereigns are requirements of CIL.20 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that sovereign immunity is a question of general, and not federal law. 203
Unlike the other two CIL doctrines I have reviewed thus far, foreign
sovereign immunity found its first judicial expression in the federal
court system. In Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,204 Chief Justice
Marshall announced the doctrine in a libel suit in admiralty against a
French naval vessel. As I will explain, Marshall's broadly worded
opinion provided little, if any, guidance to three important strands of the
foreign sovereign immunity doctrine: (1) the immunity granted to a foreign sovereign's property and corporations; (2) the procedures for recognizing sovereign consent to domestic jurisdiction; and (3) the effect
of a foreign sovereign's non-recognition. While federal courts played a
more important role in foreign sovereign immunity doctrinal development than in the other two CIL doctrines discussed in this part, state
courts nevertheless played a crucial role in formulating these three
strands of doctrine, and, in some cases state courts explicitly departed
from the interpretations developed by federal courts. The "split" between state and federal courts confirms the status of CIL as "general"
rather than federal common law because the ability of federal courts to
review state court determinations of federal law is undisputed. It raises
questions, however, about the ability of this regime to maintain a uniform approach for CIL.
As this section will explain, the specter of inconsistent state and federal court interpretations of CIL did not occur because of aggressive and
frequent interventions by the executive branch. Thus, the evolution of
foreign sovereign immunity doctrine in state and federal courts is another example of the general common law regime in action. It is also an
example of the willingness of both federal and state courts to defer to

202.

See 2 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §169 (1942)

(explaining that "[w]hile it is sometimes stated that [exemptions for sovereigns] are based upon
international comity or courtesy, and while they doubtless find their origin therein, they may now
be said to be based upon generally accepted custom and usage, i.e. international law").
203. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).

204. Id.
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the executive branch's suggestions on the application of a doctrine of
CIL.
1.

Marshall and Foreign Sovereign Immunity

Because Marshall's opinion in Schooner Exchange lays the foundation for later state and federal court development of the sovereign immunity doctrine, I will review Marshall's reasoning in some detail.
While admitting that he was "exploring an unbeaten path, with few, if
any, aids from precedents or written law," Marshall did not hesitate to
state his principles of law broadly. 2°5 He began by stating the basic
principle of traditional CIL. "The jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute." 20 6 In a "world of
distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence,"
therefore,
any exceptions must arise from the consent of the sovereign
207
itself.
A potentially serious conflict arises, however, if one sovereign enters
into the territory of another. The receiving sovereign has absolute sovereignty, but the visiting sovereign cannot concede its own absolute
sovereignty. To preserve the dignity of both sovereigns, international
law will assume that the visiting sovereign "can be supposed to enter a
foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that
the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though
not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him."20
The hard question, however, is figuring out how to apply this broad
principle to specific cases. In particular, in what forms does a sovereign
receive such immunity? Marshall noted that the principle of foreign
sovereign immunity was already understood to extend to the person of
the sovereign, that sovereign's diplomatic representatives, and that sovereign's military personnel. 209 But none of these cases explicitly controlled the question Marshall faced.
The key to understanding the accepted sovereign immunities, Marshall reasoned, is the public purpose served by the sovereign instrumentality. 2'0 No sovereign would send a diplomatic representative to
speak on his own behalf while at the same time subjecting that repre-

205. Id.at 136.

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
at 137.
209. See id. at 116.

210. See id.
at 142-46.
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sentative to local jurisdiction. Similarly, a sovereign whose naval ships
have been forced into a friendly foreign port by poor weather could not
2 11
have intended to subject his military forces to local jurisdiction.
"Such interference cannot take place without affecting his power and
dignity., 21 2 Therefore, Marshall stated, it seems a principle of "public
law, that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power
as exempted by the conopen for their reception, are to be considered
213
sent of that power from its jurisdiction."
Three interesting features of Marshall's opinion are particularly
noteworthy. First, the case arose in federal court, not because it involved resolution of questions of CIL, but because it was an admiralty
action. As this discussion will show, many, if not most, of the federal
cases in the area of foreign sovereign immunity arose in the federal
courts' admiralty jurisdiction, while most non-admiralty sovereign immunity cases were handled in state courts. This state of affairs is consistent with my account of the Founders' judicial framework, where
courts acquired jurisdiction over matters involving CIL based on particularized grants of jurisdiction rather than federal question jurisdiction.
Second, Marshall refused to resolve the question of whether a foreign
sovereign's private property also received immunity from local jurisdiction. He did note that the author of one influential treatise believed
that the private property of a foreign sovereign lacked special immunity
and that a foreign sovereign himself could be made a party defendant in
214
such cases. But Marshall did not express an opinion on this question.
His opinion does emphasize, however, that a sovereign's military forces
are much more intimately related to a sovereign's public character than
to a sovereign's private property, thus implying that foreign sovereign
immunity was not absolute. As we shall see, subsequent courts would
struggle to resolve this intimation that sovereign immunity may or may
not apply depending on the type of sovereign activity involved.
Third, Marshall emphasized that a local sovereign may in fact exercise local jurisdiction over another sovereign by explicitly stating its refusal to waive its absolute sovereignty within its territorial jurisdiction.
In other words, Congress and the President may decide to exercise jurisdiction over the visiting sovereign, but that decision would not be
made by the courts. In a statement foreshadowing the Charming Betsy

211.
212.
213.
214.

Seeid.
Id. at 144.
Id at 145-46.
See id. at 144-45.
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doctrine,2 15 Marshall stated that "until such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as
having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would
be a breach of faith to exercise. 21 6 This statement implies that Marshall
assumed that the United States' political branches held the power to
violate CIL, even though he had just articulated and applied these rules
in his role as Chief Justice.
Marshall's opinion announced the broad principles of foreign sovereign immunity, but many questions remained unanswered. The next two
subsections will explain how state courts participated in the important
process of answering these questions.
2.

Restrictive Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity

The question of whether all of a sovereign's activities, including
commercial and other arguably non-public activities, also received immunity was confronted by the Supreme Court of New York in 1857.217
The case involved a suit to recover against a private company that had
been assigned rights by the government of Nicaragua. Because Nicaragua was involved in the dispute, the plaintiffs joined the State of Nicaragua as a co-defendant. Nicaragua demurred to the complaint pointing
out that, as a sovereign state, it could not be sued.218
Though the precise relationship of Nicaragua to the plaintiffs is not
clear from the opinion, it is more than likely that it involved some kind
of commercial dispute. The court did not, however, focus on the significance of the nature of Nicaragua's actions. Rather, it broadly proclaimed: "Undoubtedly, a sovereign ...cannot be sued in the courts of
another state or nation, for the purpose of enforcing any remedy against
them. In short, they are not subject to the coercive power of any judicial
tribunal, except where they may have expressly consented .... ,219
After stating this broad principle, the court then refused to dismiss
Nicaragua from the lawsuit because the court did not view being
"joined" in a lawsuit to be "necessarily derogatory to the character or

215. The Charming Betsy doctrine instructs courts to construe domestic law with the presumption that it does not violate customary international law. Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). For a powerful argument seeking to limit the scope of this canon,
see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role ofInternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998).

216. 11 U.S. at 146.
217. See Manning v. Nicaragua & Accessory Transit Co., 14 How. Pr. 517 (N.Y. 1857).
218. See id.

219. Id.at 517-18.
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independence of a state ....

Indeed, the court viewed the joinder as

an invitation to the state to make an appearance at which point it could
decide whether it wanted to withdraw. It found that a dismissal for want
of jurisdiction was premature. 221 In other words, the Manning court
conceded sovereign immunity, and maintained its jurisdiction over the
defendant sovereign nonetheless.
This curious decision was cited but not followed in Hassardv. Mexico,222 another case arising out of the Supreme Court of New York. The

case involved Mexico's alleged default on its bonds. The plaintiff
sought an attachment against the property of the Mexican government
in New York state. Citing both the Schooner Exchange and Manning,
the court vacated the attachment stating that "[i]t is an axiom of international law, of long-established and general recognition, that a sovereign State cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its
consent and permission., 223 This case does not directly confront the
question of whether Mexico's bond issues are public or private acts.
However, a United States attorney appeared as amicus curiae to remind
the court that it had no jurisdiction. 224 The significance of the executive's intervention is uncertain, but the role of the President in cases involving foreign sovereigns would become an increasingly important
theme of these cases.
Although both New York decisions involved sovereigns acting in arguably private capacities, the significance of how the sovereign activities were being characterized was not directly analyzed. State courts in
Massachusetts

and Texas

first considered this question in cases in-

volving suits by American investors against foreign national railway
systems. In both cases, the crucial decision turned on whether the stateowned corporation could be fairly characterized as the sovereign itself.
Both the Massachusetts and Texas state courts found that, because the
railways were completely controlled by the respective foreign governbrought against them was essenments, Canada and Mexico, any suit
227
tially a suit against that sovereign. Having reached this point, neither
court had much trouble finding that sovereign immunity existed. 22 8 The

efforts by both courts to analyze the role of the government in the cor220. Id.at 518.
221. Seeid. at 519.
222. 61 N.Y. 939 (1899), affd 61 N.Y. 940 (per curiam).

223. Id.at 939.
224. See id.

225.
226.
227.
228.

Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 83 N.E. 876 (Mass. 1908).
Bradford v. Director General of R.R.s of Mexico, 278 S.W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
See 83 N.E. at 876; Bradford, 278 S.W. at 251.
See Mason, 83 N.E. at 876, Bradford, 278 S.W. at 251.
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poration and the corporation's broad public purposes, however, is significant. This analysis implies that a state-owned corporation lacking
such characteristics might not enjoy such immunity. Significantly, no
representative of the executive branch intervened in either suit.
A New Jersey court apparently was the first to chip away at absolute
sovereign immunity. 229 A German national sued to recover stock seized
by the British government at the outset of World War I. The British
government raised a sovereign immunity defense, and the court conceded that the British corporation had acted as an agent of the British
government. 230 However, the court refused to provide such immunity
where the government's agent was alleged to have exceeded his own
government's authority. "An instrumentality of government, whether
corporate or not, although created for purposes of the very greatest importance, does not cease to be personally answerable for acts done under color of the authority conferred upon 23it,1 but, in fact, in excess of that
authority and without legal justification.,
In other words, even though the foreign sovereign itself was now
seeking to raise a sovereign immunity defense, the New Jersey court
would decide for itself whether the agent's acts were truly within the
scope of the British government's legal authority. If the acts fell outside
this scope, then the agent's act was not for a public purpose, and thus no
immunity was required. Like the Manning court, the Pilger court conceded that if the British agent proved at trial that he was indeed acting
within the scope of his government's authority, then the sovereign immunity bar might yet be raised.232
The key issue in these decisions was not whether a sovereign was
acting in some private capacity undeserving of sovereign immunity. The
clear implication from the decisions stretching back to Schooner Exchange was that immunity was not available for that purpose. The difficult question facing the state courts, then, was which institution-the
foreign sovereign, the President, or the courts themselves-should determine whether a particular act, or a particular corporation, could receive immunity. The Manning and Pilger courts therefore can be understood as supporting a court's right to make that complicated
determination, even over the explicit objections of the foreign sovereign. The Mason and Bradford decisions do not contradict this approach; even though the sovereigns in question appeared in those courts

229.
230.
231.
232.

See Pilger v. United States Steel Corp., 130 A. 523 (N.J. 1925).
See id.
Id.at 524.
See id.
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suggesting immunity, the courts themselves decided whether the sovereign's purpose for the corporation was of a sufficiently public nature.
The Hassardcourt resolved this problem in a different manner by deferring to the executive branch's judgment as to whether the foreign sovereign's actions deserved immunity.
3.

Mexico Default Cases

These different methods for determining the propriety of a sovereign's immunity came together in a series of cases in New York courts
arising out of yet another Mexican government default. After a 1922 default involving $500 million in bonds, Mexico and a committee of
banks agreed to a repayment plan whereby Mexico would transfer payments to the committee and the committee would distribute the funds to
the bondholders. Not surprisingly, the complex plan spawned equally
complex litigation in New York courts. The interaction between the
state courts and the federal government in these cases illustrates the increasing importance of the executive branch in the general common law
regime.
The first notable suit was brought on behalf of bondholders against
the committee in 1931, and the Mexican government was joined as a codefendant. 233 Some, but not all, of the agreed payments had been transferred to the committee and there was substantial disagreement about
how and when these funds should be distributed. As a provisional matter, the plaintiffs asked the New York court to place the committee's assets into temporary receivership. 234
Upon being served with a summons, the Mexican Ambassador appealed to the State Department for relief. As it did in response to protests over irregular abductions, the State Department did not seek a federal court order to block the state court action and it did not, at least
initially, appear before the state court. Instead, it sent a letter to the
Governor of New York informing him that Mexico was entitled to immunity from New York courts and "request[ed]"
that the Governor take
235
suit.
the
dismiss
to
action
appropriate
The Governor, through his own Attorney General, respectfully disagreed with the State Department's views on the scope of sovereign
immunity. Conceding that Mexico was immune from jurisdiction, the
Governor nevertheless argued that the committee's property could be
validly adjudicated by New York courts in ways that would affect
233. See Gallopin v. Winsor, 251 N.Y. 448 (1931).
234. See discussion in 2 HACKWORTH, supra note 202, § 169 at 393-94.
235. Id. at 394-95.
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Mexico's interest. New York, therefore, took no action and the New
York Supreme Court placed the committee's assets in temporary receivership.
On appeal, the State Department switched tactics and followed the
strategy it pursued in Hassard.It dispatched the U.S. Attorney for New
York to appear before the Appellate Division to explain Mexico's view
that the committee's assets were the property of the Mexican government and therefore immune from seizure. 37 This direct approach
seemed to do the trick. The Appellate Division held that Mexico was a
''necessary party in interest" in the committee's assets and the court
238
therefore had no jurisdiction over the committee's assets.
Unfortunately for Mexico, the litigation over its default dragged on
throughout the 1930s. The committee itself brought suit seeking a voluntary accounting of its assets in order to prepare for distribution to
bondholders. This time, Mexico took matters into its own hands and
made a special appearance to protest the court's jurisdiction. It successfully persuaded the lower court and the appellate division 239 to dismiss
the committee's action, based in large part on the authority of Gallopin.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed.24 °
Once again conceding that Mexico was entitled to immunity as a foreign sovereignty for cases in which it was a necessary party in interest,
the Court of Appeals observed that "[t]he problem is, primarily, whether
the Mexican government is a necessary party, because of its claim that it
owns the fund .
,24 Indeed, the issue turned on "whether the courts
must accept the assertion of the foreign State though disputed by the
appellant and the other parties to the action. 242 In other words, the
Court of Appeals was finally reaching the problem first hinted at in
Manning and directly confronted in Pilger: how should a court determine the propriety of a sovereign's claim of immunity? After surveying
recent Supreme Court authority, 243 the Court of Appeals decided that

236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Gallopin v. Lamont, 251 N.Y. 448,449 (1931).

239. See Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 5 N.Y.S. 2d 295 (App. Div. 1938); rev'd, Lamont v.
Travelers Ins. Col, 24 N.E. 2d 81 (N.Y. 1939).
240. See Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 24 N.E. 2d 81 (N.Y. 1939).
241. Id. at 83.
242. Id. at 84.

243. See id. at 85. The Court of Appeals discussed the Supreme Court's decision a year earlier
in Compania Espanola de Navagacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938) which
held that courts can inquire into the propriety of a foreign sovereign's suggestion of immunity.
While it certainly relied on The Navemar decision, there is no indication in the opinion that the
Court of Appeals felt "bound" in any legal sense by the Supreme Court's decision.
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the court itself could determine the validity of the foreign sovereign's
immunity claim. 244
The Court of Appeals did recognize an alternative method for determining the validity of a sovereign's claim of immunity: the Mexican
Government could have sought the intervention of the federal executive
branch. If the executive branch determined that sovereign immunity was
proper, the Court of Appeals would be bound to obey. 245 But in this
matter, the United States attorney representing the executive branch
presented Mexico's position while explicitly disclaiming any endorsement of Mexico's sovereign immunity claim. This disclaimer was sufficient for the Court of Appeals to decide that the "court remains free to
give to the claim of immunity 'such considerations as the Court may
deem necessary and proper."'
The Court of Appeals indeed borrowed heavily from the Supreme
Court of the United States' opinion in The Navemar to resolve the case,
but at no time did it indicate that it felt bound by that Court's decision.
In fact, as a practical matter, the Traveler's Insurance case was far more
important, in both monetary and foreign policy terms, than the simple
admiralty action adjudicated in The Navemar. The Traveler's Insurance

decision was not (and could not have been) appealed to the federal
courts, however, and it is worth emphasizing that the Court of Appeals
was given the last word on this highly sensitive matter concerning foreign relations and CIL.
4.

Waiver

While wrestling with the difficulty of developing a restrictive theory
of foreign sovereign immunity, state and federal courts liberally borrowed from each other in fashioning applications of uncertain doctrine.
As I have argued, this lack of disagreement is characteristic of a regime
where courts seriously considered the persuasive force of decisions that
did not legally bind them. However, no system is perfect and this section focuses on the first significant split between federal and state courts
in the interpretation of a CIL doctrine. The split arose over the manner

244. See Traveler's Ins., 24 N.E. 2d at 86. The court stated:
The foreign government does not become a necessary party to the action, unless the is-

sues raised in the action by the pleadings of the parties in the action cannot be decided
without the presence of the foreign government. No issue is raised merely by the suggestion of a government which refuses to intervene and to present proof to sustain its
allegations.
Id.(Emphasis added).
245. See id.
246. Id.
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in which a sovereign will be deemed to have waived its rights to immunity and consented to local court jurisdiction. The different interpretations adopted by federal and state courts confirm that sovereign immunity was considered a part of the general law independently applied by
each system of courts. But the disagreements also exposed a troubling
breakdown in the regime's ability to maintain uniformity.
This subsection will focus on numerous cases, in state and federal
court, surrounding an admiralty and common law action involving a
single Portuguese shipping company. Eventually, the courts of New
York issued three decisions and the federal courts issued a combined six
opinions on issues raised in the sprawling litigation.
247
The first major pronouncement arose in a New York state court.
The defendant raised a series of affirmative defenses, all of which were
248
overruled by the lower court. Among them was a claim that the defendant corporation was a department of the government of Portugal. As
such, the defendant argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity
from the lawsuit. The plaintiffs responded that because the defendant
shipping company had appeared in court and because it had filed an answer to the merits of the plaintiffs' complaint, the defendant sovereign
had consented to the jurisdiction of the court.2 4 9 The Appellate Division
disagreed, however, and held that it was proper for a foreign sovereignty to raise an immunity claim as an affirmative defense, even
250
though it had answered other charges on the merits.
Twelve days later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit issued its opinion on the admiralty side of the case where the defendant had raised the same sovereign immunity defense and the plaintiffs had raised the same waiver objection. 251 This time, however, the
plaintiffs won, and the Second Circuit refused to allow the immunity
defense to go forward, for two reasons. First, it held that the defendant,
by seeking an affidavit from the Portuguese vice-consul, did not adequately establish its sovereign status for the purposes of the appeal.
Second, .and more importantly, the Second Circuit claimed that a line of
cases "have now clearly held that the immunity of the sovereign, being
susceptible of waiver, 252
is lost when the sovereign enters a litigation with
a general appearance."

247. De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos De Estado, 191 N.Y.S. 864 (App. Div. 1922).
248. See id.
at 865.
249. See id.
at 866.
250.

See id.at 867.

251. The Sao Vicente, 281 F. II1 (2d Cir. 1922)
252. Id.at 114.
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The Second Circuit's ruling prompted the plaintiffs to seek reargument in state court. Less than a month later, the Appellate Division
issued another opinion which acknowledged the Second Circuit's contrary holding, but the Appellate Division refused to alter its own ruling. It observed that the Second Circuit's authorities had been considering the domestic sovereign immunity of the states of the Union.
Arguing that those same states did not posses identical kinds of sovereign immunities as foreign states, the Appellate Division looked instead
to English common law decisions for authority. In a move that would
seem strange to a nationalist view, the court then cited an English 254
court
interpretation.
Circuit
Second
federal
the
reject
to
order
in
decision
Curiously, the New York court relied on the binding authority of CIL
and the importance of sovereign immunity in the conduct of foreign relations in order to reject the federal court's interpretation. Even if the
defendant had waived his immunity defenses as a matter of state law,
"by the law of nations an adjudication binding the sovereign to pay the
judgment could not be made . . .To hold otherwise would allow the

courts of this State to endanger the peaceful relations between the
United States and a friendly sovereignty ....
Thus, the Second Circuit and New York Appellate Division openly
disagreed, in a case involving the exact same set of facts, on the question of how to construe a waiver of sovereign immunity. Consistent
with the assumptions of the general common law regime, neither court
could impose its reading of the waiver rule on the other even though
both had identified the principle of sovereign immunity as a doctrine of
CIL. The general common law regime resulted in a split between the
federal and state courts. Although the possibility of such a split has been
used by nationalist commentators to support their position,"' these
commentators probably could not have predicted that the New York
court would adopt a rule more sensitive to foreign relations in the face
of directly contradicting federal court authority.
In subsequent cases, the courts took note of this disagreement and
most eventually sided with the federal court's views.257 In 1931, for instance, a California court considered the issue as a matter of first impression and reviewed a broad cross-section of authorities including in253. De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos de Estado, 192 N.Y.S. 815 (App. Div. 1922) (De
Simone II).

254. See id. at 818-19.
255. Id.
at 820-21.
256. See Koh, supra note 2, at 1828, 1829.
257. See, e.g., The Sao Vicente, 295 F. 829 (3d Cir. 1924); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1929).
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ternational law commentators, English courts, as well as the exchange
between the New York and federal courts in De Simone before siding
with the Second Circuit's view. 258 But the very fact that the California
court felt a need to weigh the New York against the federal rule confirms the continuing existence of the general common law regime for
CIL, even in the 1930s.
5.

Effect of Recognition

Another split between state and federal courts, less dramatic, but of
no less significance, occurred in the cases concerning the effect of nonrecognition on a sovereign's claims of immunity. Like the differences in
the waiver rules, the split here occurred between New York courts and
federal courts sitting in admiralty. The Supreme Court of the United
States explicitly refused to review the New York interpretation by further confirming that New York courts have an independent right to interpret the law of foreign sovereign immunity.
The first major non-recognition case arose out of litigation spawned
by the Russian Revolution of 1919. 219 The plaintiff sued the new Soviet
government in New York courts seeking compensation for the confiscation of his property in Russia. The lower courts permitted this action
to go forward on the theory that the Soviet government had no immunity in New York courts until it was formally recognized by the President.260
The Court of Appeals reversed and rejected any relation between the
concept of recognition and sovereign immunity. The Court emphasized that nation-states exist or do not exist irrespective of other nation's
decision to grant them recognition. Sovereign immunity is not merely a
matter of comity, the Court ruled. Rather, it is a matter of that sovereign's legal right. "Without his consent, he
262 is not subject" to our laws
courts.
local
in
lawsuit
a
to
subject
and not
Thus, "whether recognized or not, the evil of such an attempt would
be the same." 263 Moreover, "in either case to do so would vex the peace
264 Deferring to the
Department's
nations,"branch
and tie
of
the Court
permitted the
of the
the State
federal
government,hands.
executive

258. See United States of Mexico v. Rask, 4 P.2d 981 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
259. See Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Republic, 196 N.Y.S. 959 (App. Div. 1922);

Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Republic, 195 N.Y.S. 472 (App. Div. 1922).
260. See id.

261. See Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Republic, 138 N.E. 24 (N.Y. 1923).
262. Id. at 25.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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diplomatic departments of the governments to handle the dispute over
the confiscation of furs.265
The plaintiffs appealed the Wulfsohn ruling to the Supreme Court of
the United States but were turned away with a brief per curiam decision
dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of the
Act of September 6, 1916,266 which limited the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions to matters involving the federal constitution, federal law, or treaties. 267 The per curiam ruling also
cited Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, a decision where Justice

Brandeis held, in a different jurisdictional context, that questions of
sovereign immunity raise questions of general law only. In other
words, the Supreme Court would not review a state court interpretation
of sovereign immunity, even if the state court appeared to base its decision on CIL.269

Less than a year after the Court of Appeals decision in Wulfsohn, and
during the time when the plaintiffs in Wulfsohn were seeking Supreme
Court review, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
was faced with an almost identical legal question. 270 In an admiralty action involving a Turkish ship, the defendants raised the sovereign immunity defense claiming that the ship in question was an instrument of
the Turkish government. 7 '
The district court ruled against the defendants on several grounds, including a federal precursor of the "commercial activity" exception to
sovereign immunity. 272 However, the court based its decision mainly on
the fact that "at the time of seizure" the defendant's ship "enjoyed no
immunity from such restraint, inasmuch as diplomatic relations between
the United States and Turkey were then severed, and that therefore
comity and courtesy due from this country to Turkey did not, in the absence of the appropriate suggestion from the State Department of this

265. See id. at 24.
266. Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 266 U.S. 580 (1924) (per curium).

267. See Act of September 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (limiting the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions to matters concerning the federal constitution,
federal laws, or treaties).
268. See Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440 (1923).

269. Professor Stephens argues that Wulfsohn is wrongly decided because it would have involved state courts in adjudicating sensitive areas of foreign policy. See Stephens, supra note 2, at
429 n. 189. As a historical matter, Professor Stephens' analysis completely fails to account for the
innumerable state court decisions involving sensitive sovereign immunity matters.
270. See The Gul Djemal, 296 F. 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
271. See id.at 567.
272. Id.
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government, require the extension of such immunity. 273 Once again,
the federal courts had adopted a rule less deferential to the foreign sovereign than the rule adopted by state courts. Indeed, the federal court
theory views sovereign immunity as merely an act of comity not required by international law.
The district court's decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court on
other grounds, so the Court did not face the conflict between the district
court's theory and the Court of Appeals' theory of sovereign immunity. 274 Under the general common law theory, however, the Supreme
Court could have disapproved, but not reversed, the New York rule. In
any case, subsequent New York courts continued to follow Wulfsohn,
even after they recognized the split between federal and state authority
on the very nature of sovereign immunity. 275 For instance, in 1942, the
Appellate Division observed that "the rule forbidding suit against a foreign sovereign without his consent does not rest on comity, but is applied because such suits involve claims of a political nature which are
not entrusted to the municipal courts.

276

When presented with the con-

trary authority from Gul Djemal, the Appellate Division simply inditheory adopted in Gul Djemal is not controlling in New
cated that the
277
York courts.

As we saw in decisions regarding sovereign immunity waiver, the
general common law regime permitted federal and state courts to adopt
conflicting rules of sovereign immunity without any possibility of unification by the Supreme Court of the United States. The split between the
New York and the federal courts continued as the federal courts continued to reiterate that sovereign immunity is a matter of comity while the
New York courts found sovereign immunity to be a requirement of international law. 278 The rise of the executive-led immunity regime ended
at 569.
273. Id.
274. See The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924). The Court's decision focused on whether the
sovereign's claim could be raised by an unofficial representative, and not on the lack of diplo-

matic relations.
275. See, e.g., Nankivel v. Omsk All Russian Gov't, 142 N.E. 569 (N.Y. 1923); Voevodine v.

Gov't of Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces in South of Russia, 249 N.Y.S. 644 (App. Div.
1931).
276. Telkes v. Hungarian Nat'l Museum, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 419, 423 (App. Div. 1942). Interestingly, the Telkes opinion also distinguished the Supreme Court's affirmance of Gul Djemal by
pointing out that the Court affirmed on different grounds not relevant to the case. See id at 432,
424. Its reference to the Supreme Court authority is intriguing, however, because under the gen-

eral common law regime, the Telkes court should still be free to follow its own rule.
277. See id.
at 423.
278. See e.g., Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). See also 25 A.L.R. 3d § 4(b) n. 10 (1969)
(pointing out split between federal and New York courts).
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the practical significance of this disagreement. But as a matter of historical interest, the fundamental disagreement between the New York
and the federal courts on the nature and application of an important
doctrine of CIL, or at least an important doctrine affecting foreign relations, further exposes the gap between the nationalist assumptions and
the general common law regime.
6.

The Rise of Executive Lawmaking

After the Mexico debt litigation cases, the Executive Branch began to
assert its power to "legislate" sovereign immunity through its "suggestions" to state courts. In a series of decisions, courts in New York,
Maine and Pennsylvania all endorsed the new regime whereby courts
were bound to follow executive suggestions on whether to grant immunity. Conversely, if the executive presented no suggestion, as was the
case in Traveler's Insurance, the courts could feel free to apply its own
view of foreign sovereign immunity.
Thus, a New York court felt free, due to an executive non-suggestion,
to find that a state-owned Polish bank was not entitled to sovereign immunity. 279 A year later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine dismissed
a lawsuit against a similarly situated Nicaraguan corporation based entirely on the suggestion of the executive. 2 8 It is interesting that neither
state court felt bound by federal court determinations, except perhaps on
the broad constitutional question of the extent of the executive's independent authority to suggest immunity. The decisive federal actor in
sovereign immunity determinations was unquestionably the President.
Eventually, the executive-led regime was formally endorsed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2811 and the New York Court of Appeals. 282
Thus, the executive could essentially control determinations of sovereign immunity from the end of World War II through the 1970s, at
which point, Congress stepped in to codify the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as federal statutory law. This discussion reveals, however,
that before the President and Congress acted, the task of resolving the
hard and difficult questions of sovereign immunity in practice was
equally shared by state and federal courts. Consistent with the general
common law regime, neither set of courts had the final word on any in-

279. See Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201 (App. Div. 1940).
280. See Miller v. Ferrocarrill Del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 18 A.2d 688, 690 (Me. 1941).
281. See F.W. Stone Eng'g Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos of Mexico, 42 A. 2d 57, 59-60 (Pa.
1945).
282. See United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 56 N.E. 2d 577, 580-81 (N.Y. 1944).
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terpretation. But both sets contributed to the groundwork for presidential and congressional codification.
D. Prohibitionon Intercourse with Enemy Aliens
The law of nations has historically endorsed the imposition of certain
disabilities on enemy aliens during times of war. As Vattel explains:
When the head of a state or sovereign declares war against
another sovereign, it implies that the whole nation declares
war against the other, as the sovereign represents the nation,
and acts for the whole society. Thus these two nations are
enemies, and all the subjects of the one are enemies to all the
subjects of the other.28 3
Because the declaration of war between sovereigns immediately
transforms every individual subject and citizen of those sovereign nations into enemies, the traditional law of nations naturally required that
enemy aliens be accorded different legal status than alien subjects'hailing from friendly powers. In particular, the treatise writers found that
the law of nations imposed severe restrictions on the nature of contacts
between subjects of sovereigns at war with each other.
By the time American courts considered these rules, they had become
basic tenets of the English common law. 284 Still, American courts recognized the rule's origins in the law of nations. The development of
these CIL doctrines provides another useful historical case study of the
complex interrelationship between federal and state courts in the application of the law of nations.
Like the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, the doctrine prohibiting intercourse with alien enemies was introduced into American law
by both state court and federal court opinions, initially stated in the
broadest possible terms and then slowly whittled back by a series of
later state court opinions.

283. See VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 3, ch. 5, §. 70 (Joseph Chitty ed. 1858). Other

leading international law treatises stated similar positions. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, bk. 3., ch. 3., § 9 (Francis Kelsey trans., James Scott ed.
1925); The leading American treatises also stated the rule as a matter of international law. See,
e.g., THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 123 (1883);

HENRY WHEATON,

ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 309 (3d ed. 1889).

284. See The Hoop, 1 C. Rob. 196 (1799); see also discussion of English authorities in Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438 (N.Y. 1819).
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War of 1812

Although some early pre-Constitution state courts had made references to the doctrine, the first expansive American statement of the
doctrine was made by Justice Story, sitting in his capacity as a circuit
judge, in a case arising out of the admiralty jurisdiction. "I lay it down
as a fundamental proposition, that strictly speaking, in war all intercourse between the subjects and citizens of the belligerent countries is
illegal, unless sanctioned by the authority of the government, or in the
exercise of the rights of humanity. 28 6
Applying this rule, Justice Story upheld the seizure of an American
vessel on the high seas because the vessel had been traveling under license from Britain during the War of 1812, even though there was no
proof that the ship was engaging in commerce that would
benefit Brit' 28 7
ain. "Every aid," he stated flatly, "... is strictly inhibited.
In addition to affirming Justice Story in The Julia, the Supreme Court
adopted a similarly broad-reaching view of the scope of the doctrine in
The Rapid which involved a Boston merchant named Harrison who
sought to retrieve English goods he had purchased before the outbreak
of war with England. 88 On the way back to Boston, the goods were
seized by an American privateer, and Harrison argued that, because he
had completed his purchase of the goods prior to the war, his retrieval
of the goods did not constitute commercial intercourse with the enemy.289 That doctrine, Harrison maintained, should be limited to prohibiting the negotiation and execution of contracts.2g
The Court, speaking through Justice Johnson, rejected Harrison's attempt to limit the application of the rule stating that the "object, policy
and spirit of the rule is to cut off all communication or actual locomotive intercourse between individuals of the belligerent states. ' 291 Therefore, "[i]ntercourse inconsistent with actual hostility, is the offence
against which the operation of the rule is directed ...."
The Supreme Court's statement of the doctrine, as Justice Story admitted, was broader than its typical formulation in the treatises, which
285. See Hoare v. Allen, 2 U.S. 102 (Pa. 1789) (applying non-intercourse rule to allow interest

on debt to be suspended during wartime); Foxcraft v. Nagle, 2 U.S. 132 (Pa. 1791) (same).
286. The Julia, 12 U.S. 181, 193 (1814) (adopting circuit court opinion of Story, J.).

287. Id. at 194.
288. See The Rapid, 12 U.S. 155 (1814). The Rapid was handed down during the same term as
The Julia.
289. Seeid. at 156.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 162.

292. Id.
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usually stated the prohibition in terms of "commercial intercourse.

2 93

Although the actual "intercourse" in The Rapid involved crossing the
Canadian border into Nova Scotia in order to retrieve goods that had
been purchased before the outbreak of the war, as opposed to the trade
between Britain and a non-belligerent country in The Julia, the Supreme
294
Court found both activities to be prohibited under the law of nations.
The first lengthy state court foray into this doctrine occurred a few
years later in a New York case arising out of the War of 1812. While
essentially adopting the Supreme Court's broad formulation of the intercourse doctrine, the manner in which the New York court analyzed
the doctrine sheds further light on the non-hierarchical relationship between the federal and state courts.
Griswold v. Waddington involved a commercial dispute between two
Americans, the Griswolds, and Henry Waddington, a British subject,
where the Griswolds sought to enforce a contract entered during the
War of 1812 against Joshua Waddington, an American citizen who was
Henry Waddington's brother and alleged business partner. 295 Thus, the
court faced two questions: (1) Could the Griswolds enforce a contract
made with an enemy alien during the time of war? (2) Could the Griswolds enforce the contract against Joshua Waddington
on the basis of
6
Joshua's partnership with this enemy alien brother?9
The members of the New York court (then called Senators) published
several opinions, but the key opinion came from the court's erudite
chancellor, James Kent. He began consideration of the first question by
applying the by-now familiar method of "finding" the proper rule of the
law of nations. Kent first consulted the major treatises on international
law and concluded that a declaration of war between sovereigns automatically created a state of belligerency between all subjects of the two
sovereigns. 297 This state of belligerency made commercial intercourse
between subjects unlawful under the law of nations. 298
Next, Kent surveyed the development of the intercourse doctrine in
English courts, both the common law and the admiralty courts, and concluded that the English courts have uniformly adopted a rule prohibiting
any form of trade between enemies without license from the sovereign.299
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

The Julia, 12 U.S. at 193.
The Rapid, 12 U.S. at 155, 161, 162; The Julia, 12 U.S. at 181, 193-95.
16 Johns. 438 (1819).
See id.at 445.
See id.
at 448-50.
See id.
at 450-52.
See id.at 456-57.
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Finally, Kent turned to American authorities. First, he found that the
frequent declarations against trading with the enemy by the Continental
Congress during the Revolutionary War were intended to be declarations of the common law rules existing in the several states rather than
independent prohibitions. H°° Only then did he turn to the Supreme
Court's decision in The Rapid.30 Though he seemed to state that the
Supreme Court's decision "must be regarded by us all as the undisputed
law of the land," it is not at all clear that this statement meant that Kent
considered the Supreme Court's opinion to be binding authority. 3°2 It is
possible, even likely given Kent's exhaustive discussion of other
sources of law, that Kent's statement refers to the persuasive, rather
than binding, nature of the Supreme Court's ruling. Moreover, as we
shall see, state courts would not hesitate to chip away at the broad
sweep of the rule announced in The Rapid.
Civil War

2.

The next major wave of cases involving application of the nonintercourse doctrine arose in the wake of the Civil War. Though the war
between the states was, in theory, an internal conflict, both federal and
state courts recognized that the law of nations governed many of the legal disputes, including the application of the non-intercourse doctrine. A
detailed discussion of key cases from this period applying the nonintercourse doctrine illustrates how state courts played a leading role in
narrowing the broad version of the non-intercourse doctrine announced
by The Julia Court.
Justice Horace Gray, who would later be remembered for his opinion
endorsing international law in The Paquete Habana,303 opened the next
major discussion of the non-intercourse rule from his perch on the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. In Kershaw v. Kelsey,3° Justice Gray
confronted a case that seemed to fall within the broad language of The
Julia as well as Griswold. In Kershaw in 1864, the defendant, a citizen
of Massachusetts, leased a cotton plantation from the plaintiff, a citizen
of Mississippi. After being chased off by some Confederate soldiers, the
defendant returned to Massachusetts and refused to continue to pay rent.
The plaintiff sued in Massachusetts court, and the defendant claimed
30 5
that the non-intercourse doctrine invalidated the lease agreement.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See Griswold, 16 Johns. at 460.
12 U.S. 155 (1814).
16 Johns. at 460.
175 U.S. at 677.

304. Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561 (1868).

305. See id.
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Gray's opinion in Kershaw deserves detailed discussion because it
demonstrates how an influential state court opinion can modify and
eventually reform a rule of CIL. He began by pointing out that the nonintercourse doctrine required a "consideration of fundamental principles
of international law." 30 6 Consulting English common law sources, Gray
established that the outbreak of war prohibited all commercial intercourse. Turning to American authorities on the subject, he conceded
that Supreme Court opinions in cases like The Rapid and The Julia appeared to prohibit all contracts and every kind of intercourse. But the
language in those cases, Gray argued, constituted "obiter dicta" and was
therefore unnecessary to reach the results of those cases. 307

Rejecting the non-intercourse defense, Gray directly challenged the
basis for this dicta by reviewing the English common law authorities as
well as the treatises cited by Chancellor Kent. Citing more recent
authority from both the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Massachusetts courts, he offered his own version of the rule:
The law of nations, as judicially declared, prohibits all intercourse between citizens of the two belligerents which is inconsistent with the state of the war between their countries;
and that this includes any act of voluntary submission to the
enemy, or receiving his protection; as well as any act or contract which tends to increase his resources; and every kind of
trading or commercial dealing or intercourse, whether by
transmission of money or goods, or orders for the delivery of
either, or through the intervention of third persons or partnerships, or by contracts in any form looking to or involving such
transmission, or by insurances upon trade with or by the enemy.

308

Not only did Grey identify prior authority inconsistent with this formulation as mere "dicta," he also strongly implied that such holdings
should be rejected because they reflected an outdated version of the law
of nations that did not share the modern trend toward limiting the effects and constraints on individual contract-making. 309
Gray's lengthy re-statement of the non-intercourse rule reflects an
attempt to limit the rule to "commercial intercourse." To the extent that
prior opinions appeared to cover activities not easily fit within this category, such as traveling under license to a third country or forming a
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.at 562.

Id.at 567-68.
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 573.
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partnership across borders, Gray included them as specifically prohibited conduct. The broad formulation of the rule, however, was essentially rejected.
3.

Real Property

That Kershaw represented a departure from the rule announced in
The Julia and The Rapid can be seen in a different result in a similar
opinion reached by the Supreme Court of Iowa. In Hill v. Baker, the
court considered the legality of a wartime conveyance of real estate
from a citizen of Ohio to a citizen of Virginia.310 The Iowa court held
that war "places an entire restraint upon all commerce andfriendly intercourse" between citizens of hostile states. 31 Therefore, the court
"felt constrained to hold that the execution of the deed ... was in violation of
the principles of international law, and is, of consequence
, 312
void.
While one might be able to distinguish the facts of the two cases, the
key elements for the purposes of the doctrine are the same. Both cases
involved a real estate transaction and both required a citizen of one belligerent to make payments to a citizen of the other belligerent. The purchase of real estate in an enemy's territory "furnishes the enemy the
sinews of war, and may embarrass the enforcement of any acts of confiscation to which it may be found expedient to resort.'
It is hard to
see how the continuance of lease payments by the Massachusetts citizen
in Kershaw did not also "furnish the sinews of war" to a citizen of the
enemy.
The different results reached by the two state courts on a similar fact
pattern demonstrates that the general common law regime could result
in a division of opinion. Moreover, it further emphasizes the less than
fully binding authority of the Supreme Court of the United States'
statements in The Rapid and The Julia. In Kershaw, the Supreme
Court's broad formulation of the non-intercourse doctrine in The Rapid
and The Julia are not only distinguished, but are derided as having no
basis in common law or international law. The Supreme Court's opinions are considered as important authority, but no more important than
those of English judges or, for that matter, Massachusetts judges.
Meanwhile, in Hill, where Chancellor Kent's statements in Griswold

310. Hill v. Baker, 32 Iowa 302 (1871).
311. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).

312. Id. at311.
313. Id.
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and his Commentaries are cited heavily, the Supreme Court's own
statements of the rule, cited by Kent himself in Griswold, were ignored.
Approximately one year after the Iowa Supreme Court's decision, the
New York Court of Appeals faced another difficult application of the
non-intercourse doctrine. The plaintiff, the survivor-beneficiary of a
pre-war life-insurance policy holder, sued New York Life for benefits.3 14 New York Life Insurance Company, citing Griswold v. Waddington, refused to pay on the grounds that the decedent was a citizen of
Alabama and that the war and the non-intercourse doctrine voided the
insurance contract.31 5
Turning away from Griswold, the Court of Appeals embraced the
more limited formulation found in Kershaw. "The general rule undoubtedly is, that it is only commercial contracts, such as give aid and comfort to the enemy" that fall within the doctrine. 31 6 Citing Kershaw's
statement of the rule and its holding that a pre-war lease may survive
after the war, the court found that "it is idle to say that
317 [a life insurance
contract] fosters or implies commercial intercourse.,
The Court of Appeals' rejection of Griswold (and implicitly the broad
formulation of the rule in The Rapid and The Julia) demonstrates another aspect of the general common law regime. State courts not only do
not feel bound by previous decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, but they may freely depart from a rule announced in their
own jurisdiction as well. Unlike a modem positivist court concerned
with lines of judicial authority, the emphasis of a court applying general
common law is on the correctness of the rule and not which court stated
the rule.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court of the United States did not
wrestle with the application of the non-intercourse doctrine to life insurance contracts. The Court's treatment of these cases reveals some of the
tensions in the general common law regime, but it also confirms the coequal roles of federal and state courts in the application of this international law doctrine.
4.

Life Insurance

The first reported life insurance case to reach the Supreme Court of
the United States was appealed from a Virginia Supreme Court decision
that reached essentially the same result as the Sands Court. In New York
314. Sands v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 N.Y. 626 (1872).

315. See id.
316. Id.at 633.
317. Id.at 634.
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Life Insurance v. Hendren,318 the Supreme Court was squarely faced
with the question of whether the non-intercourse doctrine applies to life
insurance contracts.
Because this question required the application of "the general laws of
war, as recognized by the laws of nations," however, the court refused
to assert its appellate jurisdiction. 319 A decision made upon principles of
the general common law, the Court decided, did not involve the Constitution, laws, treaties, or executive proclamations of the United States,
and it did not create appellate jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act.320 The Hendren result foreshadows similar decisions about
appellate jurisdiction over the law of nations in Ker and Wulfsohn.
The life insurance issue returned to the Court on appeals from decisions in the lower federal courts. 32 1 In New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Statham,322 the Court reached a result that differed from that reached by
state courts like the Sands court. Where premiums on the policy had
been interrupted due to the war, the Court held that such policies could
be cancelled, but that the holder could retain the "equitable value" of his
policy.323 It is noteworthy that counsel for Statham cited Sands as well
as several other state court decisions that had reached a similar result as
the Court of Appeals. 324
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, the next major life insurance case
to reach the Court, the Court openly acknowledged its split with the
state courts on the application of the non-intercourse doctrine to life insurance contracts. 325 Davis raised the question of whether payments to
an agent of the insurance company would allow the policy to survive
the war. In other words, the plaintiffs now argued that though the outbreak of war made payments across enemy borders impossible, the war
did not interrupt the principal-agent relationship between New York
Life and its brokers. Therefore, as long as the premiums were paid to
the agents, who were on the Confederate side of the border, no violation

318. 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
319. Id. at 286.
320. Id. at 287.

321. Federal jurisdiction was probably acquired on diversity grounds in the Circuit Court for
Mississippi or via the general federal jurisdiction over the District of Columbia.
322. 93 U.S. 24 (1876).
323. Id.

324. See discussion of the arguments offered by the plaintiffs. Statham, 93 U.S. at 29 (citing
Stathan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 Miss. 592 [sic]; Cohen v. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
50 N. Y. 610; Sands v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 324, at 626 (cited for the proposition,
"It had no other effect than to suspend the remedy upon, or the performance of, it.").
325. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 95 U.S. at 425 (1877).
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of the non-intercourse rule had occurred and the policy remained enforceable.
The Court again turned away this attempt to limit the application of
the non-intercourse rule. In doing so, it admitted that it was aware that
its result was inconsistent with the results reached by several state
courts. "In some recent cases in certain of the State courts of last resort,
for whose decisions we always entertain the highest respect,
326 a different
view has been taken; but we are unable to concur therein."
The results of this trio of cases may seem odd to a modem reader. In
resolving a question of the proper interpretation of international law, the
Supreme Court first refused to assert its appellate jurisdiction because
no federal question had been presented. When cases came to the Court
with other bases for federal jurisdiction, the Court took the cases and
reached results at odds with their state court counterparts.
The Court's acknowledgement that the lower state courts had reached
different results highlights the two-way nature of the general common
law regime's treatment of international law: while state courts were free
to depart from rulings of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court was
likewise free to adopt its own view of the proper interpretation. The
proper application of the non-intercourse doctrine demonstrated that the
general common law regime was not always able to develop consistent
rules of international law.
Commentators espousing the nationalist position have attacked the
result in Hendren suggesting that the decision does not mean that a
question of international law is not a federal question. But their attempts
do not take into account the Supreme Court's subsequent cases as well
as the previous state court cases.
For instance, one nationalist commentator suggested that the decision
could really be explained as a way for the Supreme Court to avoid jurisdiction over a flood of post-war cases involving the application of the
laws of war.327 However this legal realist explanation is offered without
any further historical evidence. Indeed, as the Davis and Statham cases
demonstrate, the Supreme Court was probably flooded with more of
those life insurance cases anyway.
Another commentator simply concluded that Hendren was wrongly
328
decided and argued that the dissent in Hendren was the correct view.
This is a much more serious objection to the result reached in Hendren.
But even if one ignored the views of the six justices in Hendren (and
326. Id. at 425-32.
327. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 427-28.
328. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 374 n. 14.
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ignored consistently reasoned Supreme Court decisions in Ker and
Wulfsohn as well as Justice Bradley's own acknowledgement of the inconsistent state court views in Davis), Justice Bradley's dissent does not
represent a clear endorsement for the modem nationalist view.
It is certainly true that Justice Bradley advocated treating what he
329
calls "unwritten international law" as the law of the United States.
Nevertheless, he does not ground federal question jurisdiction on that
basis alone. Rather, he argued that the non-intercourse with the enemy
defense was actually governed by federal law because it was implicitly
authorized by Congress's declaration of war and the federal government's subsequent execution of the war. "It is under the authority of the
government of the United States that the party is not only shielded, but
prevented from, the execution of his contracts. If he performed
them, it
330
would be a violation of his obligations to his government.0
In other words, Congress essentially federalized the non-intercourse
doctrine by its declaration of war. On this basis, Bradley argued, international law can become a federal question for the purpose of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state courts.
However, this
is not quite an adoption of the wholesale nationalist position that would
view any form of CIL as a question for federal courts, whether or not
implicitly authorized by Congress or the President.
Almost immediately after the United States entered the First World
War, Congress acted to specify the extent of its prohibitions on trading
with the enemy. Though the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917332 offered statutory definitions of who and what would be prohibited during
the war, some state courts continued to independently apply the nonintercourse doctrine where parties did not rely on the TWEA.3 33 However, for the most part, Congress's intervention in 1917 and the rise of
an elaborate federal statutory regime restricted even peacetime trade
federalized the remaining vestiges of the non-intercourse doctrine.
The pre-TWEA development of the non-intercourse doctrine remains
instructive on how an international law doctrine was developed and

329. Hendren, 92 U.S. at 287-88.

330. Id.at 288.
331. See id.
332. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 3(a).

333. For instance, a New York court, citing Sanders and Kershaw alongside authority from the
Supreme Court, refused to void a foreign exchange contract between two German citizens. Because both parties were in New York during the time of the transaction, and because there was no
proof that the transaction contemplated transfer of funds to Germany, the court refused to void the
transaction. It is the transmission of property or money across enemy lines "which is prohibited
by international law." Kannengeisser v. Israelowitz, 176 N.Y.S. 535, 536 (App. Div. 1919).
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modified by the general common law regime. First, the Hendren and
Davis cases confirm that state and federal courts analyzed the application of the non-intercourse doctrine as a question of general common
law. This meant that each system of courts was free to reach decisions
independently subject only to the persuasive authority of the other systems of courts. Unlike the Ker-Frisbee and diplomatic immunity in
transit doctrine, applications of the non-intercourse doctrine split different state courts as well as state and federal courts.
Second, state courts played a key role in the development of the nonintercourse doctrine. Indeed, Justice Gray's opinion in Kershaw appears
to have played a key role in reformulating and narrowing the doctrine's
scope. While it is true that the development of the rule was not completely consistent and uniform, the ability of a single state court opinion
to influence other federal and state courts should not be underemphasized. It is worth noting that the eventual TWEA formulation hewed
much more closely to the Massachusetts decision in Kershaw than The
Rapid.

Finally, the Hendren case confirms that the Supreme Court considered the applicability of a doctrine of international law to be a question
of general law rather than a federal question. Therefore, it both tolerated
and acknowledged the development of different applications and interpretations of this doctrine in the federal and state court systems.
E.

Summary

This section provides the basis for a few general observations. First,
even though federal courts could not review the application of these CIL
doctrines, state courts rarely diverged in their interpretation of CIL.
Consistent with the idea of a general common law, state courts looked
to the same treatises and precedents as highly persuasive but not binding
sources of law. Part of this could be explained by the persuasive power
certain states, New York in particular, held in the interpretation of many
of these CIL doctrines.
Second, it is worth emphasizing again that all the relevant actors-state courts, federal courts, Congress, and the President-treated
CIL as a part of the general common law. State courts cited other state
courts, federal courts, and English courts as authority, but they did not
seem to afford federal courts any special deference. This makes sense
within the general common law intellectual framework, however odd
this might seem to us today.
Third, the application of many of these doctrines did have real ramifications for foreign affairs. However, it was the Executive and Legisla-
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tive branches, and not federal courts, that would intervene to represent
the national interest in maintaining a unified foreign policy. Even these
interventions, however, often saw the Executive branch treating state
courts in the same way that they treated federal courts. The Executive
and Legislative branches asserted their constitutional authority as the
national representatives of foreign affairs, but they did not seek additional authority from federal courts to buttress their arguments, either in
the form of jurisdictional preemption or binding federal precedent.
Indeed, at some points the Executive branch seemed to only have the
power to request action on the part of the governors of the individual
states. On the other hand, state courts and state governments would
obey the Executive's requests despite never explicitly admitting that it
was their legal duty to obey Executive branch interpretations of CIL.
As this part explained, however, the federal government did eventually unify the interpretation and application of all of these CIL doctrines. However the federalization of these CIL doctrines was accomplished by Congress and the President, and not by the federal courts.
The next part will discuss the significance of this historical analysis for
the ongoing debate over the proper status of CIL in the American legal
system.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE STATUS

OF CIL
Though this article does not attempt to conclusively resolve the complicated question of how American courts should treat CIL, its findings
strongly suggest that the historical evidence does not support the nationalist view. Therefore, the historical evidence vindicates revisionists
at least to this extent. Whatever its merits from a policy perspective, the
nationalist view really is a "modem position. 3 34
As I have explained earlier, adherents to the nationalist view of CIL
have relied heavily on two broad historical claims to support their position. First, they have argued that the Framers intended to guarantee federal control over the application of the law of nations in American
courts. Second, they have insisted that state courts have not played a
significant role in the development of CIL in American law because
courts have always understood that federal courts ultimately controlled
CIL interpretations. I discuss each claim in light of the historical evidence reviewed in this article. Then, I consider some of the policy consequences of my analysis for the courts today.

334. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 4, at 816 n.2.
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OriginalIntent

The Second Circuit's analysis in Filartiga335 reflects the widespread
consensus about the Founders' intent with respect to CIL and federal jurisdiction. "The Framers' overarching concern that control over international affairs be vested in the new national government to safeguard the
the nations of the world therefore
standing of the United States among 336
reinforces the result we reach today."
As I argued in Part I, this widely accepted understanding is, at best,
an overstatement. The Founders appeared to focus not on federalizing
CIL as a whole, but on federalizing those types of CIL cases that would
directly affect foreign relations. Moreover, the actions and statements of
the Congress and the Attorneys General plainly contemplated a role for
state courts in the application of CIL. That they did so is not exactly
surprising given the difficulty of separating the law of nations from
general common law and the limited role of federal courts at that time.
In my account, the Founders used specific grants of jurisdiction to
federalize certain cases likely to implicate foreign relations. They then
left the job of deciding the proper allocation of jurisdiction between the
federal and state court systems to the first Congress. It is unlikely that
there was ever an intellectual consensus on the proper scope of federal
court jurisdiction over the law of nations because this question was
deeply intertwined with deep-seated controversies over the general
common law. A lack of consensus on how it would all work makes
sense given the dearth of federal judicial models available in the eighteenth century.
For the purposes of the modem debate, however, both the absence of
consensus among the Founders and the advocacy by some Founders of a
vigorous role for state courts cut strongly in favor of the revisionist
view. Certainly, my account lends almost no support to the originalist
claims of some scholars on behalf of the nationalist view.
Recognizing the force of the revisionist critique, some nationalist
scholars have offered a more nuanced historical claim. Instead of
claiming that federal courts were essentially granted exclusive jurisdiction over questions of CIL, these scholars have argued that the Founders, in broad terms, intended to allocate all matters involving foreign
affairs to the federal government. These scholars have emphasized the
allocation of the power to make treaties and the power to "[d]efine and
[p]unish" offenses against the law of nations as evidence that the Foun335. 630 F.2d at 885.
336. Id.at 887.
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ders intended to create federal government
supremacy over all questions
337
involving foreign affairs, including CIL.
I do not attempt to evaluate the merits of these claims for unfettered
federal supremacy in the area of foreign relations here. However my description of the attitude of key members of the Founding generation toward CIL and state courts shows that, at least with respect to the allocation of jurisdiction over cases involving the law of nations, the Founders
did not intend to constitutionalize federal supremacy. Indeed, Congress's decision not to federalize jurisdiction over all questions of CIL
led to the development of a rich jurisprudence of CIL in state courts.
B.

HistoricalRole of State Courts

The nationalist scholars' assumption that the Founders granted federal courts a monopoly on the development of CIL in American law has
led them to ignore the important role state courts have played in the development of CIL doctrines. As I have noted, this omission is surprising
given the importance of this assumption to the overall validity of the
nationalist view. Unfortunately for adherents to the nationalist view,
Part II's sketch of the role state courts played in the development of four
CIL doctrines further weakens the historical foundations of the nationalist view.
Specifically, Part II describes a regime where state courts played a
co-equal role in the origination, development, and reformation of CIL
doctrines. Consistent with the assumptions of a general common law regime, state courts would look to Supreme Court and federal court opinions as only one of several equally persuasive sources of authority on
questions of CIL.
Federal courts have at various times acknowledged the supremacy of
state courts over the interpretation of CIL within their own jurisdictions.
For example, the Supreme Court has, on several occasions, refused to
assert its appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions interpreting
CIL on the grounds that CIL alone does not raise a federal question."'
337. See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and
Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations, " 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 447 (2000) (arguing
that Constitution's textual grant of power to "define and punish" confers unconstrained federal
power over foreign affairs); Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargainingand

the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (finding federal monopoly on foreign relations
and CIL in a "dormant treaty power"); David M. Golove, Treaty-making and the Nation: The
HistoricalFoundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1075 (2000) (arguing that treaty power delegates to federal government separate plenary power
unconstrained by Tenth Amendment).
338. See, e.g., Wulfsohn, 266 U.S. at 580; Ker, 119 U.S. at 436; Hendren, 92 U.S. at 286.
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The prominent role of state courts in the development of CIL doctrines-and the federal courts' willingness to assent to their role - also
further weakens the nationalist version of the Founding. If the Founders
intended to guarantee federal court supremacy over the law of nations,
why have state courts historically exercised the authority to develop
CIL free from the review of federal courts?
For these reasons, my survey of the role of state courts in the development of CIL lends historical plausibility to the revisionist position.
Rather than assuming that the Constitution itself federalizes all questions of CIL, the revisionist account emphasizes the key role of the political branches in deciding whether and how to allocate control over
CIL decision-making. In my historical account, Congress created exclusive federal jurisdiction over some CIL matters but left others open to
the general jurisdiction of the state court systems. These CIL doctrines
were hardly backwaters. They touched on sensitive foreign policy questions of diplomatic immunity, extradition, sovereign immunity, and
trading with alien enemies. At some point, Congress or the President
acted to federalize these questions, but until that action by the political
actors, state courts remained important fora for application of these
doctrines.
C.

PracticalNecessity of a Federal Court Monopoly

While my sketch of the role of state courts strongly increases the
historical plausibility of the revisionist view, I do not claim that it can,
or that it should, conclusively resolve the modem debate over the status
of CIL. The problems with the historical foundations of the nationalist
view identified in this study, however, do suggest that it is the nationalist scholars, rather than the revisionist scholars, who bear the burden for
proving why courts should treat CIL as federal common law. In addition
to arguments made on the basis of claims about history, nationalist
scholars have made persuasive policy arguments about the practical necessity of the modem view. 339 I believe that my study has some relevance for answering this policy argument as well.
One prominent nationalist scholar has argued that, if the revisionist
view were accepted, we would face the specter of 50 different parochial
interpretations of CIL. 340 My study demonstrates that even though key
doctrines of CIL were immune from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States, serious splits between state court in339. See Koh, supra note 2, at 1828-29 (pointing out potential policy confusion of having fifty
different laws for "head of state" immunity).
340. See id. at 1828.
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terpretations of CIL did not occur nearly as frequently as might be expected. Moreover, state courts were just as likely to protect U.S. foreign
relations interests as federal courts. Finally, there is evidence that state
courts would defer to executive suggestions on the proper application of
CIL, thereby giving the President effective control over some types of
CIL such as sovereign immunity. Therefore, this account shows that the
chaos of independent state court interpretation of CIL has been the rule,
rather than the exception, for much of American history.
V.

CONCLUSION

G. Edward White has sagely warned against the dangers of "purposive" historical analysis, or the use of historical research to support a
particular policy preference. 341 Professor White has noted that such purposive scholarship has been highly influential in the field of constitutional foreign relations law. 342 This article has been an attempt to remedy some of these failings. It sharply challenges the history-based
claims of scholars arguing on behalf of the nationalist view of CIL. It
has offered historical evidence that contradicts and undermines nationalist assumptions about the dominance of federal courts in the interpretation and application of CIL.
As Professor White also notes, it would be equally dangerous to conduct a historical inquiry for the purpose of insisting upon the revisionist
view of CIL. While I am convinced that the historical plausibility of the
revisionist proposal for CIL is strengthened by this article, I have attempted to avoid indulging in the kinds of purposive analysis that Professor White has criticized. My aim has not been to "prove" the revisionist case. Rather, I have tried to show that the historical foundations
for the revisionist position are at least as strong, if not stronger, than
those for the nationalist view. At the very least, I believe I have established that the
revisionist position can no longer be dismissed as mere
",nonsense."343

341. See G. Edward White, The Historical Turn in the Constitutional Law ofForeign Relations, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 133-34 (2000).
342. See id. at 138-39.
343. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 371 (essentially describing revisionist view as "nonsense").
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